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Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at
Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers

Ira C. Lupu and Robert Tuttle*

Post-Script: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 70 U.S.L.W. 4683 (No.001751, June 27, 2002)
On the final day of the 2001-02 Term, the U.S. Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the
case involving the constitutionality of the Cleveland voucher
program. In a 5-4 decision, the Court (per Rehnquist, CJ) held that
programs that give parents a “true,” “genuine” and “independent”
choice among various educational options may include scholarships
for use at sectarian schools among those options. The Court
concluded that the Cleveland program met the constitutional
requirement of “true private choice.” The dissenting Justices
rejected the majority’s emphasis on intervening private choice, and
would have held the Cleveland program to be a violation of the
Establishment Clause because the program resulted in a transfer of
money, unrestricted as to use, from the state to sectarian schools.
We presented this piece several days prior to the oral
argument in Zelman, and we completed our substantive work on the
article prior to the decision in Zelman. The Zelman opinion relies
almost exclusively on a norm of intervening private choice as
insulation between the state and religious institutions, but the
opinion is radically untheorized – it relies almost exclusively on
precedent and fails to explain the constitutional significance of
* Ira C. Lupu is the Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law at George Washington University
Law School; Robert Tuttle is a Professor of Law at George Washington University Law School. The
authors are the co-directors of the Legal Tracking Project of the Roundtable on Religion and Social
Welfare, sponsored by the Pew Charitable Trusts. The opinions in the article are those of the authors, and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Pew Charitable Trusts. Our thanks to Dean Michael Young of
the George Washington University Law School for financial support for this project; to Vince Blasi, Marty
Lederman, Jim Ryan, and our colleagues at George Washington for helpful comments on an earlier version
of this paper; and to Michael Patrick for invaluable research assistance.
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private choice. Moreover, it does not grapple with how to measure
the validity of that choice in constitutional terms.
This paper, though antecedent in time to Zelman, may help
fill some of the jurisprudential gaps left by the opinion. We too rely
on a theory of “genuine and independent” private choice as a metric
of permissible voucher programs that include sectarian providers,
but we do our best to explain that theory in detail, and to analyze the
ways in which application of that theory may vary from context to
context. The Court did not pursue our suggested lines of inquiry
into the extent to which voucher programs steer beneficiaries into
religious experience. Nor did it ask, as we do in this piece, what
steps the state should take to absolve itself of responsibility for any
religious experience undergone by voucher recipients. Nevertheless,
we think the article has much to offer a reader in search of a
theoretical grounding for the approach in Zelman. We hope that
our emphasis on service contexts other than education will be
particularly illuminating.
We have many specific observations about the Zelman
opinions, and we expect to offer that commentary in forthcoming
work. Here, we limit ourselves to the view of vouchers, sectarian
providers, and the state that occupied our minds in the winter and
spring of 2002.
Those who design government services select from a thick catalogue of
options. The first and most basic choice designers face is whether
government agents should deliver the service directly to recipients, as in the
case of public schools, or whether government instead should finance private
providers of such services. If government prefers to operate through private
entities, it then can choose between two general approaches to financing the
services. In the first approach, the financing scheme depends on decisions
made by the service recipients. Programs involving recipient choice include
child care,1 schemes of public support for private education,2 and substance
1 Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(2) (1994 & Supp. V,
1999).
2 These include programs in support of higher education. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep’t. of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). Most of the controversy about voucher programs, however, has
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abuse treatment. In these and similar programs, which we will refer to
hereafter as voucher programs, eligible recipients are authorized to select
among providers, which then may collect payment from the government for
services rendered.3 Alternatively, in arrangements which we hereafter will
call non-voucher programs, government finances the work of private social
service providers in ways that are not directly tied to the number of recipients
served.4
At the level of policy, as well as that of constitutionality, significant
controversy has arisen over the use of private entities to perform
governmental functions. Critics worry, for example, about the loss of
accountability, constitutional and otherwise, that typically comes with
privatization.5 Even in cases in which privatization is uncontroversial,
however, there may be serious debate over the appropriate means of financing
such service providers. Because non-voucher programs typically produce a
flow of cash, not dependent on units of service delivered by the provider, such
programs may facilitate budgetary planning, boost fledgling providers, and
sustain providers that lack significant financial reserves. In contrast, vouchers
may maximize the choices available to recipients and better tailor government
expenditures to the services actually provided.6
involved elementary and secondary education. The most recent programs of this sort include one in
Milwaukee, Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998), another in
the State of Florida, see http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org, and a third in Cleveland, Ohio. Id. The
constitutionality of the Cleveland program, which we analyze later in this paper, is at issue in the U.S.
Supreme Court this Term. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533
U.S. 976 (2001) (No. 00-1751).
3 Voucher programs may include goods, such as food or shelter, rather than or in addition to, services
such as counseling or training. As we define the term, voucher programs do not depend upon the issuance
of any certificate or other physical manifestation of the financing scheme; rather, voucher programs earn
that characterization by the elements of beneficiary designation of the provider coupled with government
payment based on individualized services or goods provided to the beneficiary.
4 These direct arrangements may include grants from the government, or contracts with it. This
distinction typically reflects different regimes for making awards and/or monitoring performance. For our
purposes in this paper, however, grants and contracts are considered non-voucher programs and are
constitutionally indistinguishable.
5 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM. URB. L.J.
1507, 1537-41 (2001); Matthew Diller, Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307 (2001); Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between
Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061 (2000). For a
view that de-emphasizes the accountability worries and emphasizes the benefits of privatization, see Ronald
A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449 (1988); Clayton P. Gillette & Paul
B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 481 (1998).
6 Defenders of vouchers frequently assert that programs dependent on recipient choice will be more
efficient because, with proper program design, they approximate the conditions of a competitive market,
including consumer sovereignty, the entry of new firms, and the demise of failing ones. See MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (2nd ed. 1963). For other economic perspectives on vouchers, see
David Bradford & Daniel N. Shaviro, The Economics of Vouchers, in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF
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Although that policy debate is important, this paper focuses on the
questions of religious exercise and establishment raised by the inclusion of
faith-based organizations in voucher programs.
The conventional
constitutional wisdom, borne out by decisions of the last thirty years, is that
non-voucher programs that transfer unrestricted funds to faith-soaked service
providers face insuperable constitutional obstacles,7 while voucher programs
that include such institutions stand a fighting chance to survive.8 Indeed, the
staunchest defenders of vouchers typically contend that voucher programs
solve most, if not all, problems of religious establishment associated with aid
to faith-based organizations.9 Voucher proponents argue that the choice
exercised by service recipients disconnects the government from the religious
character of the service provider, thus avoiding Establishment Clause

PUBLIC SERVICES (C. Eugene Steurle, et al. eds., 2000). The germinal work on school vouchers from an
economic perspective appears in Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Robert A. Solo ed. 1955). Other commentators focus on vouchers as a way of
combating the tendencies of entrenched government bureaucracies in the provision of service, see, e.g.,
JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990), or as an
instrument for lifting the poorest children out of failing public schools, see SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds.) (1999).
7 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that state grants of salary supplements to
teachers of specified secular subjects in private, sectarian schools violate the Establishment Clause). The
Supreme Court’s past two encounters with aid to sectarian schools have approved such aid, but neither
involved the transfer of unrestricted funds, and both involved programs which limited the aid to secular
uses. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding that states and localities may lend educational
materials, restricted to secular use, to sectarian schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding
that the federal government may pay public employees to teach remedial, secular subjects in private
sectarian schools).
8 See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wisc. 1998) (upholding Milwaukee’s school voucher
program, which includes deeply sectarian schools), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998). One of the authors
of this piece has expressed the view that a well-designed program of vouchers for use in elementary or
secondary schools may well survive Establishment Clause attack. Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly
Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS, & PUB. POL’Y 375 (1999).
The distinction between voucher and non-voucher programs was dramatically illustrated in the recent
decision in Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002),
in which the Court invalidated, as a violation of the Establishment Clause, a non-voucher arrangement
between the state welfare department and Faith Works, a religion-intensive program for substance abusers,
but held for trial the question of whether a voucher-type arrangement between the Department of
Corrections and Faith Works was constitutional. The crucial question reserved for trial was whether the
state could prove that recipients had accepted the services “of their own free choice.” Id. at 978.
The Supreme Court decisions that seem best to support the constitutional distinction between voucher
and non-voucher programs include Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983). But see Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). We will discuss these
decisions in connection with the Cleveland school voucher case in Part III, infra.
9 See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Legal and Constitutional Issues of Vouchers, in VOUCHERS AND THE
PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 6, at 368, 385; Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not
Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 341 (1999).
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concerns.10 Voucher opponents disagree, however, and assert that the
financing mechanism is irrelevant. In their view, as long as taxpayer dollars
end up in the coffers of religious organizations, the Establishment Clause is
offended.11
In what follows, we challenge these conventional approaches to the
constitutionality of voucher programs. We argue that the presence of
vouchers as a financing mechanism is neither dispositive nor irrelevant. In
Part I, we briefly describe the theories—Religionism, Secularism,
Separationism, and Neutralism—that have tended to dominate discussion of
the Constitution’s Religion Clauses. We then explain how proponents of
these theories might analyze the constitutionality of voucher programs, and
we identify theoretical and practical weaknesses with each of these
approaches. In Part II.A, we suggest an alternative reading of the Religion
Clauses. We believe that the purpose of the Clauses is to exclude the state
from the enterprise of religious worship and devotion. Government may not
participate in, forbid, require, sponsor, or promote that enterprise.
In line with that central purpose, and consistent with the current law, the
core question for any voucher program is the extent to which it is reasonable
to impute to the government the recipient’s religious experience, if any,
arising out of that program.12 In Part II.B., we demonstrate that a thorough
answer to this question depends on a highly contextualized assessment of each
of the three relationships formed by the triangle of government, recipient, and
provider. Analysis of the triangulated relationship in turn leads us to a
typology of voucher programs, in which the state’s responsibilities vary with
type. In Part III, we apply the methodology developed in Part II to
Cleveland’s school voucher program, now before the Supreme Court.

10 Id. at 341-45.
11 Elliot N. Mincberg & Judith E. Schaeffer, Grades K-12: The Legal Problems with Public Funding of
Religious Schools, in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 6, at 394; see also
Marci A. Hamilton, Power, The Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807 (1999); Laura
S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167, 187-90 (2000).
12 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 842 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226 (1997); Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89 (1986).
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I. STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES, AND THEIR
PERSPECTIVES ON VOUCHERS
In an earlier article, we identified four standard theories of the
Constitution’s Religion Clauses.13 These theories are best understood as two
sets of opposing pairs. The first set, reflected across debates in the so-called
culture wars, is organized around contradictory answers to the question of
whether religion is a social good. The second set, ordinarily framed in the
language of law rather than culture, divides over the question of the
distinctiveness of religious institutions as compared to nonreligious
associations. Mirroring the division in the general culture, on the bench, and
within the academy, each set contains one theory constitutionally supportive
of vouchers and another, opposing theory hostile to them.
A. Religionists vs. Secularists
The first set is composed of groups we call Religionists and Secularists.
Religionists see religion as an irreplaceable moral resource for society.14
They contend that religious piety is crucial to personal ethical development
and civic responsibility. Religious institutions and commitments, in this view,
constitute a necessary bulwark against the social and moral decline that
accompanies secular individualism. Accordingly, Religionists believe that
communities of faith should be allowed, on a basis at least equal to that of
other groups, to participate in government programs designed to promote the
common good.15 Many Religionists also believe that government should have
broad authority to acknowledge religious themes, traditions, and celebrations.
Moreover, Religionists advocate special exemptions from regulatory burdens
faced by religious institutions. Religionists thus favor legal outcomes that
maximize the benefits to, and minimize the burdens on, religion. In

13 Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Institutions in Our Constitutional
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002).
14 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based
Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997); John Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious
Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779 (1986); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and
Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000). Religionism sometimes goes by the name of “accommodationism.” See, e.g.,
Stephen Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118 (1993); Michael
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
15 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the
Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 285 (1999).
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constitutional terms, Religionists argue for a weak Establishment Clause and a
strong Free Exercise Clause.
With respect to financing the participation of private institutions in
government programs, a consistent Religionist would be indifferent to the
choice between voucher and non-voucher forms. So long as religious
institutions are included in the mix of service providers, the Religionists’ goal
of promoting social welfare through faith groups is advanced. Nevertheless,
Religionists may find vouchers attractive for several reasons. First, voucher
programs seem far more likely to survive constitutional attack than nonvoucher programs. Second, Religionists may believe that voucher programs
involve less governmental regulation—with respect to religious content and
otherwise—than non-voucher programs. Third, Religionists may think that
voucher programs will generate wider involvement of small congregations
and community groups than non-voucher programs, which tend to favor
larger, bureaucratic, and largely secularized social service providers.16
The opposing group, which we call the Secularists, contends that deeply
held religious beliefs often pose a threat to social cohesion, inclusiveness,
tolerance, and other liberal values.17 In contrast to the Religionists’ view of
faith’s constructive power, Secularists tend to see religious institutions as
authoritarian and intolerant. Secularists fear that religious forces will use
government power to impose a generic—or worse, a sectarian—religiosity on
the society. Because religious institutions are perceived as threats to the
social fabric, Secularists object to any government program that provides
material aid to religious institutions, whether or not such programs encompass
a broad mix of the religious and nonreligious. Secularists are not relentlessly
hostile to religious institutions; in the Secularist view, government should
safeguard the freedoms of private religious expression and association on
terms equal to those afforded the nonreligious. Government should not offer,
however, any special protections or exemptions to religious individuals or
16 Because non-voucher programs must steer clearer of religious content than voucher programs,
providers operating under non-voucher arrangements are frequently, though by no means always,
professionalized and secularized arms of religious groups. Lutheran Social Ministries, Catholic Charities,
and the Jewish Board of Family and Childrens’ Services are typical examples of the sort of professional
organizations that receive such non-voucher aid. Stephen V. Monsma, The “Pervasively Sectarian”
Standard in Theory and Practice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 322 (1999).
17 See, e.g., JAMES DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON 171-175 (2002); Steven G. Gey, Why Is
Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990); Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Rhetoric of Religion, 20
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 619 (1998); William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
843 (1993); Susanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473 (1996);
Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992); Underkuffler, supra
note 11.
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associations; nor should government be able to engage in religious expression
of its own. The Secularist program is therefore associated with a strong
Establishment Clause and a weak Free Exercise Clause.
Like Religionists, consistent Secularists should be indifferent to the
financing mechanism employed by any government program of material aid
to faith-based organizations. Secularists, convinced of the unconstitutionality
and undesirability of non-voucher programs, see vouchers as nothing more
than a type of money-laundering,18 a change only in form of a substantively
impermissible practice. That said, Secularists may think vouchers are
marginally worse than non-voucher programs because voucher programs tend
to minimize the significance of government regulation of service providers.
For example, Secularists fear that providers in voucher arrangements may be
more free to discriminate on religious grounds in employment,19 or to use
methods that are more faith-soaked than would be permissible in non-voucher
programs. Moreover, Secularists might prefer the professionalized,
bureaucratic service agencies typically supported by non-voucher programs,
and suspect that vouchers are likely to further the religious missions of small,
congregation-based providers rather than meet the secular needs of service
recipients.
The Religionist and Secularist positions each capture small and opposing
elements of constitutional truth. Religious institutions may indeed advance
the common good, and they may act in destructively factional or intolerant
ways. The obvious incompleteness and partiality of their respective accounts,
however, reveal the common flaws of both Religionism and Secularism.
Neither view adequately explains why religious communities and
commitments are categorically more dangerous or beneficial than their
nonreligious counterparts, so both views seem to be no more than special
constitutional pleading on behalf of or against religious entities. Moreover,
their obvious partiality makes them relatively poor sources of constitutional
insight into the problem presented by vouchers.
18 Underkuffler, supra note 11, at 191 (“we must . . . reject the notion that public money can simply be
laundered through ‘private choice’ as a way to avoid Establishment Clause guarantees.”); see also Laura S.
Underkuffler, The Price of Vouchers for Religious Freedom, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 463, 473 (2001).
19 The Salvation Army has been lobbying for a focus on vouchers rather than non-voucher financing in
the Bush Administration’s charitable choice policy, because Army officials believe that the voucher
mechanism will permit escape from the requirements of some cities that all firms with city contracts must
provide benefits for domestic partners of employees equal to the benefits provided to spouses of employees.
See Dana Milbank, Story of Charity Plea Changes Again: In Latest White House Account, OMB, Not
Rove, Takes Lead Role, WASH. POST, July 13, 2001, at A2 (describing attempts by Salvation Army to get
the White House to make efforts to alter a proposed charitable choice bill in ways that would permit
vouchers to be used instead of grants to finance services by religious entities).
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B. Separationists and Neutralists
The second set of theorists is made up of groups we call Separationists and
Neutralists. Compared to the first set, which tends to dominate in culture and
politics, this second set tends to be well-represented on the bench.20
Separationists and Neutralists are not defined by their degree of friendliness
or hostility to institutions of faith; instead, they are defined by their efforts to
provide internally consistent answers to questions concerning the legal
distinctiveness of religious organizations.
Separationists hold that religious institutions are constitutionally
distinctive for purposes of both benefits and burdens. Separationists believe
that firm and clearly defined barriers between government and religious
entities are essential to preserve religious purity, civil peace, or both.21 Thus,
whether the legal context be government-sponsored worship, material aid to
religious entities, regulation of employment relations within such entities, or
the myriad other ways in which government and religion interact,
Separationists consistently aspire to disentangle government from religious
practices and communities. In the terms we have used above, the
Separationists assert strong versions of both the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause.22
Like Secularists, Separationists tend to regard the distinction between
voucher and non-voucher programs as one of form rather than substance.
Any program that delivers government funds into the hands of religious
entities, by whatever route, is inherently suspect. Unlike Secularists,
20 We analyze the voting patterns of the Justices in terms of Secularism (Stevens, J.), Separationism
(Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, & Souter, JJ.), and Neutralism (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ) in
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at nn.48, 50, & 116. The Court currently includes no Religionist (nor can we
think of any Justice in our history who has been a consistent and overt Religionist), although Justice Scalia
gets as close as he can to the Religionist view without abandoning various doctrines associated with
Neutrality, discussed below. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 638 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the state’s purposes in having prayer at graduation from public schools include “fostering
respect for religion.”).
21 Melissa Rogers’s paper for this Symposium is a classic illustration of the Separationist account,
rooted in the need to protect religious communities against the body politic, and vice versa. Melissa
Rogers, Forgotten but Not Gone: Some Ways in which the Separation Tradition Protects Religion and
Fosters Religious Liberty, 18 J.L. & POL. xx (2002). Separationists and Secularists consistently fall back
on a theory, originally associated with James Madison, of the coercion of taxpayers as the underlying
justification for their views, but they never explain why it is that religious conscience is the only kind that is
constitutionally protected in this way, nor do they explain why secular expenditures which violate religious
conscience – for abortion, for example – do not fall under a similar ban. For development of these points,
see Esbeck, supra note 16, at 311-13; Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions
and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991).
22 The Separationist view is thus, of the four, the one most commonly associated with tension between
the Religion Clauses.
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however, who may find voucher programs marginally worse, Separationists—
if forced to choose between vouchers and non-voucher programs—might have
ambivalent reactions. On the one hand, voucher programs raise the specter of
government funds and accompanying regulation reaching a wider range of
religious institutions and their programs than prior policies have reached.
Thus, vouchers might foster more extensive interaction between government
and religious entities. On the other hand, the regulatory control of providers
which ordinarily accompanies voucher programs might be considerably less
intrusive than the auditing and contractual controls that characterize most
non-voucher programs. Despite these often subtle, empirical differences
between vouchers and non-vouchers, however, Separationists routinely
oppose vouchers on the ground that the distinction between voucher and nonvoucher programs is constitutionally irrelevant.23
Neutralists, the fourth camp, deny the Separationist claim that religion is a
distinct constitutional category. To Neutralists, religion is but one among
many of the human commitments that may either enhance social welfare or
threaten social harm. Accordingly, Neutralists believe that government
should treat religious and secular commitments identically with respect to the
conferral of benefits and the imposition of burdens. Because, in their view,
religion is not constitutionally distinctive, Neutralists adhere to a weak view
of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.24
Neutralists should be indifferent to the choice between voucher and nonvoucher programs, because their theory focuses solely on the equal
distribution of burdens and benefits between religious and nonreligious
institutions. Like Religionists, however, Neutralists may be attracted to
voucher programs for a pragmatic reason; if well structured, such programs
are far more likely to survive constitutional attack than their non-voucher
counterparts.
From a constitutional perspective, the second set of theories offers a more
principled approach to the relationship between government and religious
institutions than does the first set. Both Separationists and Neutralists take
internally consistent views of the Constitution’s Religion Clauses.
Separationists believe that religious institutions are distinctive with respect to
23 See, e.g., EDD DOERR ET AL., THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL VOUCHERS (1996); Steven K. Green, The
Legal Argument against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 37 (1993).
24 Leading Neutralist writing includes Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961); Mark Tushnet, “Of Church and State and the Supreme Court”: Kurland
Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373; Volokh, supra note 9. Neutralists tend to make the Religion Clauses
disappear, and therefore face the least inter-clause tension, but Neutralists have trouble explaining why they
have effectively made the Religion Clauses superfluous.
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both benefits and burdens; Neutralists believe that they are distinctive with
respect to neither benefits nor burdens. Despite this theoretical advantage,
this second set shares with the first set an identical flaw. None of these four
approaches provides a sufficiently nuanced account of the interactions
between government and religion. Like Religionists, Separationists fail to
explain why religious institutions deserve insulation from government
regulation across the full range of activities, no matter how mundane. Like
Secularists, Separationists fail to justify the total exclusion of religious
institutions from programs of government aid. Neutralists are equally
sweeping in their denial that religion is constitutionally unique in any respect.
In the Neutralist view, for example, religious worship—by individuals or
government—is completely indistinguishable from other forms of expression
or association. All four positions treat religion categorically, and thereby fail
to attend to the specific contours of interactions between government and
religion. Our theory, developed in the next section, addresses this failure.
II. OUR ACCOUNT OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES, AND WHAT IT ENTAILS
FOR VOUCHERS
Thus far, we have categorized the dominant strains of Religion Clause
theory and have suggested how each addresses the issue of vouchers.25 We
have also identified weaknesses in each of the four strains. Each has some
element of constitutional wisdom, but all seem to ignore or repress important
aspects of the evolving story of the relationship between religion and
government. In what follows, we trace the outlines of an alternative theory of
the Religion Clauses. With this theory in hand, we then turn to issues raised
across a wide range of government voucher programs that involve religion
and religious institutions.
A. The Religion Clauses Reconsidered
First, as between the two sets of views identified in Part I, we believe that
the shared perspective of the Separationist-Neutralist pair—that the
distinctiveness of religious institutions attaches either to the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, or to neither one—is a necessary feature
of any constitutionally plausible account of the Clauses. Those who reject
this symmetry and contend that government should systematically either favor
25 The four groups, it might be noted, are divided 2-2 on the constitutionality of vouchers redeemable
at sectarian organizations, although there appears among them a slight preference for the use of vouchers
over non-vouchers on a mixture of empirical or pragmatic grounds.

11

The Journal of Law and Politics
or repress religious institutions bear a heavy burden of persuasion, one that
neither Religionists nor Secularists have thus far carried.
Second, as between the Neutralists and the Separationists, we believe that
the former offer a more constructive starting point. Neutralism captures the
arc of recent jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses,26 as well as deeper
constitutional logic. In an era in which equality norms dominate
constitutional understandings, claims of disparate treatment—whether the
exclusion of religious entities from government-controlled benefits, or the
exemption of such entities from government regulation—demand
justification. With respect to most activities engaged in by religious
institutions and their agents, such as purchasing property, adhering to norms
of building safety, or operating motor vehicles, the state ordinarily has little or
no reason to treat such institutions differently from their secular counterparts.
Nevertheless, decisions interpreting the Religion Clauses have retained
three core Separationist principles, none of which can be redescribed in
Neutralist terms. First, as reinforced in the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe,27 government may not engage in or
promote religious worship, though it remains free to engage in or promote any
other type of speech.28 Second, although government may provide aid for
secular purposes to religious institutions, a majority of the Supreme Court in
Mitchell v. Helms29 held fast to the principle that the government must
prohibit the diversion of such aid to religious purposes.30 Third, the Supreme
Court’s most robust embrace of Neutralism, Employment Division v. Smith,31
highlights the continuing significance of Separationism by reminding us that
courts may not “lend . . . power to one or the other side in controversies over

26 In Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), a four-Justice plurality adopted the view that the
Establishment Clause requires no more from aid programs than a religion-neutral class of beneficiaries and
a religion-neutral content to the aid itself. See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). On the Free
Exercise side, Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which strenuously rejected a doctrine of
free exercise exemptions from laws of general applicability, is a powerful statement in the direction of
Religion Clause neutrality. The line of decisions protecting the claims of religious speakers to equal access
to public fora are consistent with this trend. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S.
98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
27 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
28 See id.
29 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
30 See id. at 840 (O’Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring); id. at 868 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting).
31 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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religious authority or dogma.”32 This doctrine of nonintervention in religious
disputes, especially significant in matters involving property or employment,
has no secular counterpart.
Even the most zealous Neutralists, who may reject one or more of these
principles, do not take Neutralism all the way to its logical conclusion. A
fully committed Neutralist would include religious piety, along with health,
safety, and morals, among the purposes encompassed by government’s broad
powers to advance the general welfare. The staunchest Neutralists on the
bench, however, all adhere to the constitutional requirement that government
action must be designed to further secular, not religious, purposes.33 Given
the Neutralists’ rejection of distinctions between religion and other human
activities, their unwillingness to include the promotion of religious piety
among the legitimate ends of government requires explanation.
In our view, the secular purpose requirement shares an important
characteristic with the three, more discrete Separationist principles identified
above.34 All of these Religion Clause norms primarily involve the practices
of institutions, both private and public, rather than the religious beliefs and
activities of individuals. Both the requirement of secular purpose and the
limitation on religious speech by government prohibit the government as an
entity from pursuing distinctively religious ends or engaging in worship.
Both the limitation on government funding of religious entities, which places
their distinctively religious activities off-limits from public support, and the
prohibition on governmental intervention in intra-denominational disputes
regulate the relationship between religious institutions and government.
The institutional focus of these norms contrasts markedly with the
individualist emphasis that dominates many theories of the Religion

32 Id. at 877.
33 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing with approval the
longstanding requirement that government action must be designed to achieve secular purposes); Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 211 (1997) (reaffirming proposition that laws must have secular purpose to survive
Establishment Clause attack); cf. Edwards v. Aguillar, 482 U.S. 578, 633-34 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the secular purpose requirement may at times be unworkable, not substantively erroneous,
because of problems associated with resort to legislative history to ascertain true legislative purpose).
Professor Koppelman’s recent defense of the secular purpose requirement, see Andrew Koppelman, Secular
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002), is thick with important arguments, but it never documents the
likelihood of any of the Justices dispensing with the requirement.
34 Those who hold to more robust forms of Separationism accept these three principles, but tend to
apply them very broadly, with an eye toward insulating their underlying concerns against erosion. See
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 52, 63, 65.
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Clauses.35 A number of such theories have as their centerpiece a concern for
individual religious conscience. Although matters of conscience were of
concern to the Framers and are without question to be taken seriously, they
constitute an unstable and conceptually misplaced linchpin for Religion
Clause theory. Even if religious conscience was once believed to be a
categorically distinctive state of mind, society’s contemporary understandings
of conscience makes legal distinctions between religious and nonreligious
conscience at best highly questionable.36
This point, and the rejection of individualist religion as the determinant of
constitutional norms, is best reflected in the Supreme Court’s recent free
exercise jurisprudence. The Court’s opinion in Employment Division v.
Smith,37 which circumscribes the doctrine of free exercise exemptions from
general laws, repeatedly emphasizes the chaotic potential of any doctrine that
rests on individual assertions of sincere, conscientious objection to
compliance with general law.38 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
highlighted a series of problems that such exemption claims present; judges
must decide if the claim is religious or not, sincere or insincere, central or
peripheral to the faith, and—assuming affirmative answers to all these
questions—whether the government’s denial of such exemption is justified.39
The determinations of religiosity, sincerity, and centrality are inherently
35 See, e.g., W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty and the Call of Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 71
(1992); Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion, and the Establishment of Religion: The Beginning of an
End to the Wandering of a Wayward Judiciary?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917 (1993).
36 For further development of the proposition in text, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998). Accordingly, the
assertions of religious conscience by taxpayers, who complain of being forced to support a religious faith
against their will, no longer provide a coherent substantive ground for barring state aid to religious
institutions. For functional reasons, however, these assertions should be sufficient to provide a basis for
standing to sue; otherwise, the Establishment Clause would remain unenforced. For an opinion recognizing
standing of federal taxpayers to sue to enjoin federal expenditures alleged to be in violation of the
Establishment Clause, see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
37 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
38 See id. For examples of where individualized religion and free exercise rights may lead, see Thomas
v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause requires that members of
Jehovah’s Witnesses be viewed as having good cause, within the meaning of the unemployment insurance
statute, for refusing work on armaments, even though the sect does not hold to the belief, and moral
objections to working on armaments do not qualify as good cause) and Frazee v. Illinois Department of
Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause forbids state
unemployment compensation board from excluding self-declared Sunday Sabbatarian who belonged to no
sect or church from the ranks of those who have good cause to refuse a job requiring Sunday work).
39 See 494 U.S at 885, 886-87. The stringency of the purported standards of justification, pre-Smith,
contributed significantly to the difficulties of making consistent and principled decisions about free
exercise exemptions.
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subjective, and depend almost entirely upon the word of the claimant. Faced
with the boundless possibilities for such exemption claims that individualist
religion presents, the Court believed it had only two options: either it could
permit continuation of a doctrine that encouraged arbitrary, unprincipled, and
potentially discriminatory linedrawing, or it could reject the subjectivist
premises on which that doctrine was based. The Court chose the latter, and
did so while explicitly affirming institutional possibilities for free exercise
norms.40
The institutional emphasis of Establishment Clause principles is not yet
crystallized in a single, dramatic decision analogous to Smith, but an
institutional focus can be discerned from the case law and proves crucial for
analysis of the voucher problem. First, the Court has on several occasions
held that government may aid individuals in contexts in which it would be
unconstitutional for the state to provide direct assistance to religious
institutions. For example, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind,41 a unanimous Court upheld a tuition grant to a blind student
who wished to study at a Bible college in order to prepare to be a pastor or
youth leader in a church; direct grants to Bible colleges themselves for
support of instruction in biblical texts, even if linked to a vocational program,
would violate the Establishment Clause.42
Second, the doctrine of nonentanglement, which reflects values borne out
of both Religion Clauses, applies only to government’s interaction with
religious institutions. In the law of free exercise exemptions, courts viewed
40 Despite the withdrawal in Smith from vigorous review under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court
reaffirmed the proposition that courts should not adjudicate questions of “religious dogma” when issues of
property or personnel might turn on such questions. Id. at 877. Of course, explicit religious coercion of
individuals—forcing them to accept unwanted religious experience—is a core violation of the Free
Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). This is why forcing individual voucher
recipients into a religious experience similarly violates the Free Exercise Clause. See infra notes 77-81 and
accompanying text.
41 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
42 See id. If taxpayers had a right to insist that government funds never be used to support religious
instruction, Witters would obviously be wrong. Yet the Court was unanimous in its support of the result.
Professor Choper is one of the few scholars who thinks Witters was incorrectly decided. See JESSE
CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION
CLAUSES 169 (1995) (arguing that state payment of the grant to Witters has no secular purpose independent
of his pursuit of religious employment, and therefore violates the prohibition on using religion as an
instrument of civil policy). We think Professor Choper is misguided in application of his principle in
Witters; when the state offers to pay for a broad choice of vocational options, it is using the recipient’s
motivations, not the religious training per se, as an instrument of promoting gainful employment. For other
decisions upholding the permissibility of government transfers to individuals, in circumstances in which the
government had full awareness of individuals’ use of transferred resources for religious purposes, see
Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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the claimant’s sincerity as a proper subject of inquiry, but comparable
inquiries into the consistency between the particular practices and doctrines of
religious institutions are routinely deemed impermissible.43 In the
Establishment Clause context, the nonentanglement doctrine historically has
been applied only to interactions between government agents and
representatives of religious institutions. No comparable concern exists in the
relations between government and individuals. Finally, the long line of
decisions that bar adjudication by the state of religious questions are also
limited to disputes arising within, or involving, religious institutions.44
The primary focus of Religion Clause principles on both governmental and
religious institutions, rather than on the rights of individual believers,45
reflects the Constitution’s political—not theological or sociological—
conception of religion. Because any definition of religion for legal purposes
is a governmental act, the state cannot adopt a particular theological
understanding. To do so inevitably privileges one faith tradition over others.
Sociological definitions of religion, which depend upon some catalogue of
observed commonalities among religious groups, suffer from related defects.
Those who create these sociological definitions may identify as religious only
those elements that conform to their own preconceptions, and in any event
tend only to restate dominant or majoritarian practices.46 Like theological
43 The line of cases declaring that religious institutions are constitutionally exempt from anti-

discrimination claims in connection with the employment of clergy reflects this principle. See, e.g.,
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). For discussion of McClure and its progeny, see
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, passim. For an opinion that explicitly ties nonentanglement to both Religion
Clauses and to the freedom of religious institutions, see EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d
455, 464-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
44 Even in those situations when religious questions arise between individuals, judicial reluctance to
decide such matters frequently turns on the issue of coercing individual participation in institutional
religious arrangements. For example, the permissible contours of the relationship between the state’s
family courts and the enforcement of Jewish law was at the center of the controversy over the refusal of
some Orthodox Jewish husbands, who sought civil divorce, to deliver to their wives the necessary religious
documents to free the wives from the marriage in the eyes of their faith community. For a discussion of this
problem, see Tanina Rostain, Note, Permissible Accommodations of Religion: Reconsidering the New York
Get Statute, 96 YALE L.J. 1147 (1987). One other potential addition to this list of institutionally focused
principles is Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982), which holds that government may not delegate
coercive state power to religious institutions. No comparable doctrine exists with respect to private
individuals, who, when otherwise properly empowered to act coercively towards third parties, may act out
of religious motivations.
45 As we note above, individual believers are protected by the Free Exercise Clause against direct
religious coercion by the state. Individual believers are also protected by the speech and press protections
of the First Amendment, see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), as well as by the Equal
Protection Clause, pursuant to which any classification of individuals based on their religious beliefs or
identity would presumably be suspect.
46 For a revealing and highly controversial example of a judicial attempt to construct a legal definition
of religion out of sociological theories of family resemblances, see Africa v. Commonwealth of
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definitions, these too raise serious concerns about religious bias. The bias
problem of course can be solved with a purely subjective account of religion –
making each adherent the definer of her own faith. As the opinion in Smith
emphasizes, however, this solution creates its own insoluble problems; it is
inherently boundless, and will lead to both unacceptable results in Free
Exercise exemption cases, and an understanding of the Establishment Clause
that would disable the government from promoting any version of the human
good.47
Neither theological, sociological, nor subjective individual accounts of
religion map with precision onto the reasons for identifying religion as a
matter of distinct constitutional concern. The Constitution addresses religion
for political, not religious, reasons. Instead of representing an aspect of
human life that the state should nourish or suppress, religion demarcates a
crucial—indeed, constitutive—boundary of the state’s jurisdiction.48 The
state governs the temporal order, the secular common good. The state has no
legitimate authority over the extra-temporal destiny or commitments of its
citizens; nor does the state have any religious profession of its own to make.
The century just ended provides a stark reminder of the destructive power of

Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3rd Cir. 1981) (holding that prisoner’s self-created theology and
accompanying practices do not qualify as a religion for First Amendment purposes). See generally Jesse H.
Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982); George C.
Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519
(1983); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984). It is
the case, however, that the definition of religion for purposes of qualifying for a tax exemption under §
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code has tended to focus on a broad collection of characteristics
normally and conventionally associated with religion. For discussion and application of the IRS rules, see
Church of the Chosen People v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Minn. 1982); The Church of the
Visible Intelligence That Governs the Universe v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 55 (1983). The IRS rules, of
course, have no consequence outside the realm of taxation; a failure to qualify under these rules cannot
preclude an organization from claiming religious status for other purposes.
47 The implications of a subjective definition of religion are most easily seen in Free Exercise cases. If
individuals are entitled to exemptions from laws that burden their religiously motivated acts, and the
individuals are the sole authorities with respect to which of their acts are religious, the result can only be, as
the Smith court recognized, jurisprudential chaos. The implications of a subjective view of religion are
somewhat more subtle in Establishment Clause cases. If individual perceptions control the definition of
religion under the Constitution, then any action of the government that any individual perceives to be
religiously motivated – including civil rights laws, environmental laws, or abortion restrictions – may be
challenged as a forbidden establishment.
48 See Carl Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint: Validations & Ramifications,
18 J.L. & POL. xx (2002); Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
373, 381 (1992) (stating that theology, worship, and religious ritual are outside the jurisdiction of
government).
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any state that makes claims on all aspects of its citizens’ lives and sets itself
up as an object of worship.49
This political understanding of the Religion Clauses prohibits the state
from intentionally engaging in, sponsoring, coercing, encouraging, or
discouraging religious worship and devotion. Most of the protective quality
of this prohibition will run to the benefit of religious institutions, which are
typically the organizers, authors, and custodians of worship traditions.50 To
the extent government policy intentionally aims at the worship practices of
individuals, however, the prohibition applies with equal force. For example,
the practice of state-sponsored prayer in public schools, held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court,51 constitutes a dual violation of the Religion Clauses.
State-composed prayer involves government officials in forbidden authorship
of religious ritual,52 and recital of such prayer in public schools coerces
students either to engage in worship, or publicly signal their unwillingness to
do so.
B. The Reconsidered Religion Clauses Applied to Vouchers
If, as we claim, the state must leave in private hands the experience of
devotion to ultimate authority or concern, the state may not pay for such
experience in non-voucher programs.53 To do so is to violate the Madisonian
injunction against using faith as “an instrument of civil policy,”54 and to put
49 See HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951); for further discussion of this theme,
see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 83-84.
50 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that the
city may not single out worship practice of animal sacrifice for disfavored treatment). Although the peyote
use in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), led to individualized legal consequences, the
factual setting of the use of the substance was also a worship ritual practiced by an organized religious
community.
51 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
52 The authorship, recital, or promotion of prayer by military chaplains may be distinguished, and
found constitutionally acceptable, on the theory that the institution of the chaplaincy is necessary to protect
the free exercise rights of military personnel, forced by their orders to be away from their civilian faith
communities. See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985). Administering an institution like the
chaplaincy without running afoul of the Constitution may not be easy. See, e.g., Adair v. England, 183 F.
Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2002) (ruling on some aspects of a complaint that the Department of the Navy
discriminates against non-liturgical Christian Navy chaplains).
53 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000)
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D.
Wis. 2002). The state, however, may pay for a secular portion of such programs, assuming the secular and
the religious can be separated for accounting purposes without excessive state monitoring of religious
institutions. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 84-88.
54 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS 29 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). For a creative and important recent effort to tie Madisonian
concerns to the problem of the constitutionality of vouchers, see Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and
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the state, as payor, in a position to dictate the content of faith. Voucher
programs, however, may disconnect the state from the worship experience in
constitutionally sufficient ways. The core question for any voucher program,
therefore, is the extent to which it is reasonable to impute to the government
the recipient’s religious experience, if any, arising out of that program. When
the design of the program creates substantial pressures on recipients to
undertake religious experience, the program as a whole may violate the
Establishment Clause.55
To be true to the unbroken path of Establishment Clause adjudication over
the past forty years, inquiry into the existence of such pressures must extend
beyond the narrow, often impenetrable question of whether the state intends
to promote religious experience. Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in
1963 in School District of Abington v. Schempp,56 the reigning approach to
Establishment Clause questions has focused upon the state’s responsibility for
the religious effects of policies enacted to achieve secular goals.57 Though
only hinted at in Everson v. Ewing Township,58 this inquiry surfaced in the
1960’s in the context of challenges to Bible reading in public schools59 and
the loaning of textbooks from the state to sectarian schools;60 took on a crucial
role in the 1970’s in Lemon v. Kurtzman61 and its progeny,62 regarding state
assistance to sectarian schools; continued into the 1980’s in cases involving
state endorsement or support for religious messages;63 remained vital in the
1990’s in cases involving graduation prayer,64 aid to sectarian schools,65 and
religious gerrymandering;66 and lives on in the 2000’s in cases concerning
Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
783 (2002).
55 Even if the voucher program, viewed in its entirety, avoids such pressures, application of it in
particular instances may violate the Free Exercise Clause. For discussion of this possibility in a particular
voucher context, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
56 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
57 Id. at 222 (declaring that a policy is unconstitutional if its “purpose and the primary effect” advances
or inhibits religion).
58 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
59 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
60 Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
61 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
62 See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Ed., 413 U.S. 472
(1973).
63 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
64 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
65 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
66 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
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governmental financial support for religion67 as well as cases involving statebacked religious speech in the public schools.68
Moreover, the precise formulation and analytical focus of the inquiry into
effects has changed somewhat over the past forty years. Those changes serve
only to buttress our view that the relevant question in voucher cases is not
about an imposition on taxpayers, who of course will be obliged to pay for
religious experience whether or not recipients have meaningful choices
among providers. Instead, the question of forbidden effects in voucher cases
is about the state’s role in creating pressures and incentives toward religious
experience in ways that make it more likely to be undertaken than would have
been the case in the absence of the voucher program.
The concern for impermissible state pressure in the direction of religious
commitment is hardly a new theme in Establishment Clause adjudication.
Indeed, this was the analytical centerpiece in Abington School District v.
Schempp,69 in which the question, as framed by the Supreme Court, was
whether the practice of Bible reading to begin the public school day had the
“primary effect”70 of advancing or inhibiting religion. In later decisions, such
as Board of Education v. Allen71 and Lemon,72 the language of the effects test
remained the same, but the focus seemed to shift sharply toward the
probability that the state had become engaged in financing religious
experience. Most recently, the rise of both the endorsement and coercion tests
have returned the question of forbidden effects to the government’s
complicity in religious experience. The emphasis on effects in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU,73 in which a Court majority adopted Justice O’Connor’s
proposed endorsement test, is focused upon the perception of reasonable
observers that the state has, by its message, created religious insiders and
outsiders, not on the undisputed fact that the state is spending taxpayers’
money to display religious messages. Moreover, Lee v. Weisman,74 the
graduation prayer decision, emphasizes the constitutional impermissibility of
state-created compulsion—in fact, even if not in law—to participate in prayer

67 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
68 Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
69 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
70 Id. at 222. The Abington court also considered whether the Bible reading practice had a secular
purpose, but it did not limit its inquiry to questions of governmental intention.
71 392 U.S. at 243.
72 403 U.S. at 612, 613.
73 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
74 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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as the price of receiving the benefit of participation in commencement.75 And
this thematic emphasis is reinforced in the Court’s most recent majority
opinion in an Establishment Clause controversy, Agostini v. Felton,76 in which
the Court asked whether the effects of the state’s policy included “a financial
incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.”77
Thus, whatever the Establishment Clause context, and even as the
particular formulation of the doctrine of forbidden religious effects has taken
on more complex coloration, the Supreme Court has consistently focused on
the obvious and foreseeable religious consequences of state policy, and has
turned in particular toward the effects on the targets or recipients, rather than
the tax-paying financiers, of religious experience. This attention to those
whom the state may be effectively indoctrinating is a crucial reminder that,
however laudable and secular the state’s ultimate ends may be, the state may
not now, as in Madison’s time, exploit religious devotion for civic,
governmental purposes.
Erroneously and unhelpfully focused on the rights and interests of
taxpayers rather than the experiences of recipients, voucher proponents and
opponents alike take a conceptually impoverished view of whether the
government should be held constitutionally responsible for the religious
consequences of voucher programs. Both groups describe the set of
relationships involved in voucher programs as a straight line running from
government to recipients and then to service providers. For proponents of
vouchers, the intermediary position of recipients decisively breaks the
connection between government and service provider. Opponents highlight
the direct line between the source and eventual destination of the money and
treat the recipient’s place along that line as constitutionally irrelevant.
Neither view captures the experience of recipients in ways that illuminate
whether the state should be held accountable for religious content.
As we conceptualize vouchers, the image of a triangle better reflects the
constitutionally significant relationships. Each of the three actors in these
programs—government, voucher recipients, and service providers—relates to
the other two in ways that highlight the relevant features of voucher schemes.
1. The relationship between voucher recipients and the state

75 See id. at 593-94.
76 521 U.S. 203 (1997). The more recent decision in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 US. 793 (2000), did not
produce a majority opinion, so Agostini remains the last Establishment Clause case to do so.
77 521 U.S. at 231.
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We begin with the relationship between government and voucher
recipients. This relationship involves three elements important for our
analysis. First, recipients may or may not be free to choose whether to use the
voucher at all. Second, recipients select from the universe of eligible
providers, but the range of choice varies among programs. Together, this pair
of choices bears on the degree of freedom the recipient exercises with the
voucher, and thus the extent to which the government can fairly be said to
have “steered” the recipient toward any particular service. Third, government
creates such programs in order to generate specific outcomes for beneficiaries
– nutrition, shelter, education, sobriety, or health, among others. The kind of
outcome the government desires from the program also bears on the extent to
which it can be held accountable for any religious experience associated with
that outcome.
The relationships between government and recipients in some voucher
programs offer little reason for constitutional concern. For example, consider
a program—call it “Book Stamps”—in which the government provides each
person with a $20 voucher, redeemable for books at any place of business
where books are regularly sold. The program is designed to promote literacy,
but of course has the side effect of subsidizing publishers and booksellers.
Such a program would predictably lead to the acquisition of Bibles and other
devotional materials, just as it would lead to the purchase of self-improvement
books, pulp mysteries, and steamy romance novels.
Although it is completely foreseeable that recipients of “Book Stamps”
may purchase religious tomes, the particulars of the recipient-government
relationship in the program render wholly unreasonable any claim that the
government is constitutionally accountable for religious experiences that
recipients might derive from the program. First, recipients are not compelled
to redeem the vouchers; government is not requiring its citizens to buy books,
and, despite what we scholars may think, books are hardly necessities of life.
Second, recipients have a staggeringly broad range of choices among books,
including a virtually unlimited number of nonreligious options. Third, the
government is indifferent to the content of books acquired. Its purposes of
fostering literacy and aiding the book industry are fully served whether
recipients read religious or nonreligious books, so long as recipients buy and
read. The reader’s response to the literature—titillation, transformation, or
edification—is a matter entirely apart from the government’s purposes in the
“Book Stamps” program.
Other voucher programs will have quite the opposite effect. Such
programs effectively steer recipients to particular service providers and
promote outcomes that are inseparable from religious experiences. Consider
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here the example of vouchers for service at drug treatment programs offered
to criminal defendants as alternatives to incarceration for drug crimes. The
government’s ostensible purposes in such a program include rehabilitation of
drug-dependent defendants and, perhaps, relief of pressure on overcrowded
prison facilities.78 Assume that in a particular community, the only available
programs at which vouchers can be redeemed are infused with methods of
faith-based character transformation.79
The three aspects of the government-recipient relationship that determined
the validity of “Book Stamps” all point in the opposite direction in this case.
First, recipients are powerfully constrained in their choice of whether or not to
avail themselves of rehabilitation services;80 the only alternative to voucher
redemption is prison time. Second, the choice among providers is limited to
religious options; although recipients have a choice to make, no providers
offer nonreligious treatment services. Third, in marked contrast to “Book
Stamps,” the government’s purpose in this case is inseparable from the
religious transformation promised by these providers. What government
seeks in such programs is not limited to the cessation of drug-related criminal
behavior; rather, by directing recipients81 into comprehensive treatment
regimens, government is trying to effect fundamental changes of character,
outlook, and associational preferences.82
These two paradigmatic voucher programs exist at either extreme of a
constitutional spectrum. Most voucher cases, of course, fall between the
78 For discussion of these programs, see Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse
and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999); Developments in the Law: Alternatives to
Incarceration For Drug Abusing Offenders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1898 (1998). See also Office of National
Drug Control Policy Fact Sheet, Drug Treatment in the Criminal Justice System (March 2001), available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/94406.pdf).
79 In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002),
Judge Crabb suggested that probation officers might be pushing defendants into a single, faith-intensive
provider, because it was the only provider in the community offering a 12-month, residential program for
substance abuse.
80 Indeed, in some states, drug treatment is mandatory; defendants have no option to select ordinary
incarceration. See, e.g., Robert Granfield et al., An Evaluation of the Denver Drug Court: The Impact of a
Treatment-Oriented Drug Offender System, 20 LAW & POL’Y 183 (1998).
81 People in these circumstances are in a complex, mixed role of criminal defendants, service
recipients, and agency clients.
82 Not all court-referred programs for substance abuse have each of these features in equal measure.
For a general description of drug treatment courts, see Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components, Drug
Courts Program Office, U.S. Dept. of Justice (January 1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/dcpo/Define. For a description of the comprehensive therapeutic goals implicit
in the drug court movement, see Hora, et. al., supra note 78. For a critique of the comprehensive
therapeutic goals of drug courts, see Richard Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment
Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1206 (1998).
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extremes, and thus present more difficult questions of constitutionality.
Consider, for example, the well-established program of federal block grants to
states and localities for the payment of child care expenses of low-income
families.83 Families may use child care vouchers to pay child care centers
operated out of homes (“home-based care”), religious providers, nonreligious
providers in institutional settings, and even their own relatives.84 In fact,
almost as many children in the program are in relative care and home-based
care as are in day care centers.85 Like our hypothetical “Book Stamps”
program, the child care program will inevitably and foreseeably include
religious content; some relatives, some home-based providers, and most
religious institutions will engage in religious instruction while providing the
care. The question is whether this religious activity by providers impairs the
constitutional validity of the child care program.
To answer this question, we return to the three issues identified earlier.
First, with respect to the choice of using the voucher or not, the child care
services must be seen in the broader context of public welfare programs.
Some families who participate in the program are recipients of Temporary
83 Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(2) (1994 & Supp. V,
1999). The Child Care Development and Block Grant is one of four federal child care development
programs that were folded into the Child Care Development Fund by the welfare reform legislation of
1996, which goes under the title of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). See http://www.os.dhhs.gov. Some low-to-middle income families are eligible for
child care vouchers even if they are not eligible for welfare payments. See 42 U.S.C. § 9858(n)(1)(B)
(making eligible for child care assistance, at the state’s discretion, an individual under the age of 13 “whose
family income does not exceed 85 percent of the State median income for a family of the same size.”).
Moreover, former recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families remain eligible for child care
vouchers even after their total 60-month eligibility for cash benefits has expired. Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193), § 908(b).
84 The relevant statutes also permit the use of contracts as well as vouchers, or “certificates,” with child
care providers, and authorize use of certificates at sectarian providers. With respect to the Child Care and
Development Block Grant, see 42 U.S.C. § 9858(n), which expressly provides that “[n]othing in this
subchapter shall preclude the use of such certificates for sectarian child care services . . . if freely chosen by
the parent.” Id. With respect to Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, see §§ 604a(a)(2), 604a(c). In
cases of grants and contracts, the use of government funds for sectarian worship and instruction is
statutorily forbidden. 42 USC § 604a(j) (2001). For further discussion of the child care program, see
Douglas Besharov & Nazanin Samari, Child Care Vouchers and Cash Payments, in VOUCHERS AND THE
PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 6, at 195-203.
85 The 1999 Report of the Child Care Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
breaks down the distribution of children in all types of care financed by the Child Care and Development
Fund, and shows that the nationwide average is 56% of children in day care centers, with the rest spread
among the child’s home, home of a relative, or family-based care (“group home’). 1999 Report of the
Child Care Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, available at
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ccb/research/99acf800/list.htm (last updated Mar. 11, 2002). The 56%
figure is a drop from the early 1990's, when closer to two-thirds of child care financed through the Child
Care and Development Block Grant Act took place in centers rather than in homes. WILLIAM T. GORMLEY,
JR., EVERYBODY’S CHILDREN: CHILD CARE AS A PUBLIC PROBLEM 127 (1995).
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Assistance to Needy Families with Children (“TANF”);86 these families,
many of which are headed by a single parent, are under a statutory duty to
engage in work as a condition of receiving TANF benefits.87 If they do
engage in work away from their children, these parents are legally compelled
to place their children in some form of child care during the work day.88
Other low-income families, eligible for child care vouchers, do not receive
TANF or any other public assistance that mandates work efforts;89
nevertheless, economic necessity may motivate the parents in such families to
seek work outside the home. If they do, the law of child neglect applies to
them just as it does to the TANF families. Thus, for virtually all families
eligible for child care vouchers, a combination of legal norms and economic
circumstances pushes them to use the vouchers.
Second, at least in theory, child care voucher recipients enjoy a very broad
choice among providers. In many locales, there is a broad array of child care
providers, including for-profit and not-for-profit, religious and nonreligious,
institutional and home-based. For those with family members nearby and
willing to care for children, this variety is even greater. It is true that most
families receiving vouchers for child care are under considerable pressure to
use them, and many child care centers have long waiting lists. Nevertheless,
the range and variety of providers suggests that the government should not

86 The program for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”) is part of the federal welfare

reform legislation enacted in 1996, as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). The TANF program replaced Title IV-A of the Social Security
Act (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), and does not have the characteristics of its predecessor as a
legal entitlement. 42 U.S.C. § 604a et seq. (1996). TANF expires this year and is now being considered for
reauthorization. For a more complete and thorough description of the TANF program, see Department of
Health and Human Services, Administration For Children and Families, Office of Family Assistance,
Helping Families Achieve Self-Sufficiency: A Guide on Funding Services for Children and Families
Through the TANF Program, available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa/funds2.htm (last visited
April 21, 2002).
87 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (2002) (obliging participant states to require parents or
caretakers of children to participate in work within 24 months or once the state determines the parent or
caretaker is ready for work, whichever is earlier).
88 The legal compulsion flows from laws prohibiting the neglect of minor children. See, e.g., CAL.
WELF. AND INST. CODE § 300(b) (West 1998) (placing under jurisdiction of the juvenile court any person
under the age of 18 whose home is an unfit place for him or her by reason of neglect.) Severely neglected
children may be removed from the physical custody of their parents or guardian. Id. at § 361. See
generally Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
89 Low-income families may receive federally subsidized child care assistance even if they are not
TANF beneficiaries. See State Policy Documentation Project – Findings in Brief: Child Care Assistance,
available at www.spdp.org/tanf/childcare/childcaresumm.htm (last updated January 2, 2001).
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ordinarily be held responsible for the religious content that might be offered
by some.90
Third, the government’s interest in child care, and its relation to religious
development, must be measured in light of the particulars of the program.
Were the providers limited to facilities licensed on the basis of their capacity
to nurture character and intellect, one might say that the program was
analogous to drug treatment in its concern for the development of the whole
person. But this is not the character of the existing child care program;91 by
including home-based and relative care in the mix of eligible providers, and
by the omission of any requirement of professional training for child care
workers, the program’s child-based goals are little more than the physical
health and safety of children.
The child care program thus stands somewhere between the two extremes
on the spectrum, but it seems considerably closer to our imaginary “Book
Stamps” program. Although the recipients may be under considerable legal
or economic compulsion to use child care services, the mix of potential
providers is sufficiently wide to preclude any reasonable claim that the
government is steering recipients’ children into programs of religious
formation. This judgment is further reinforced by government’s limited ends
in this child care program. The goal is to avoid physical neglect of children
while parents go out to work, rather than to promote a richer vision of child
development, whether religious or secular.
Although the child care program on its face appears to be constitutionally
acceptable, it is not hard to imagine particular circumstances in which this or a
similar program could be problematic. Consider those TANF beneficiaries
90 Recipients may have more control over the content of communications to their children in situations
in which relatives are the caregivers, although even in that situation the control is incomplete, and the care
provided is a package of all that a particular care provider will offer. Nevertheless, recipients presumably
can acquire a reasonable quantum of information about religious communications at the child care
providers they are considering.
91 This is reflected both by the omission of any federal requirement that voucher providers be licensed,
see Besharov & Samari, supra note 84, at 196, and by the stated statutory purposes of the Child Care
Development and Block Grant Act of 1990, which include 1. allowing state flexibility in developing
programs that meet the needs of parents and children; 2. promoting parental choice to make child care
decisions best suited to their family; 3. encouraging states to provide better information about child care; 4.
assisting states to provide child care to parents seeking to escape welfare dependency; and 5. assisting
states in implementing their own health and safety regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 9858(a). None of these
commits the federal government to any version of the well-being of children. Of course, some child care
providers will be deeply committed to child development, religious and otherwise. See Mary M. Bogle, A
Survey of Congregation-Based Child Care in the United States, in SACRED PLACES, CIVIC PURPOSES:
SHOULD GOVERNMENT HELP FAITH-BASED CHARITY? 220, 229 (E.J. Dionne & Ming Hsu Chen eds.,
2001) (“What is most evident is that the purposes of education/enculturation and evangelism (for Christian
churches) are rising with the tide of institutional interest [in child care].”)
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who live in an area in which they have no relatives willing or able to engage
in child care, no home-based care is available, and day care centers are both
scarce and, without exception, religious in character. In such a market, our
initial appraisal is that government is steering such recipients to place their
children in a religious environment. They will lose their TANF benefits if
they do not seek work and place their children in some form of approved child
care, and their choices for such care appear to force them in the direction of a
religious placement.
The dynamic or static qualities of the provider market, however, are crucial
in the attempt to measure the degree of steering the program is likely to
produce. Where barriers to provider entry, including licensing requirements
and start-up costs, are substantial, a conclusion of impermissible steering
might seem particularly warranted. In practice, however, neither of these
barriers to entry is especially high in the child care context.92 Although some
TANF recipients may have difficulty finding acceptable, nonreligious child
care in the short term, the government should not be charged with an
Establishment Clause violation for steering them into a religious placement
for child care. First, such a problem is not likely to be a common feature of
markets for child care. The available evidence suggests that the supply of
home-based care is roughly equal to the supply of institutional care, religious
or otherwise.93 Because, at any given time and place, a variety of religious
and nonreligious options for child care is likely to exist, government cannot
fairly be held responsible for encouraging parents to select religious
environments for child care. Second, even if this mix is not reflected at a
given moment in a particular locale, the market is likely to be sufficiently
fluid that nonreligious alternatives will soon appear. During the time that
only religious alternatives are available, TANF recipients may find little
practical choice but to enroll their children in such a program, but will be free
to shift to a more acceptable one when it becomes available.94
More significantly, the federal statute precludes the denial of TANF
benefits to recipients who refuse work because of the “unavailability of
appropriate child care within a reasonable distance from the individual’s

92 See Besharov & Samari, supra note 84, at 204.
93 Id. at 206. See also Table 6, 1999 Report of the Child Care Bureau of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, supra note 85 (documenting that close to half of the children in governmentsubsidized child care were in home-based settings).
94 We recognize that the usual market problem for recipients is that of finding spaces in good, existing
programs, and that shifting from one care provider to another may be difficult, and may be made more so by
the effects on the child of the dislocation.
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home or work site.”95 Although the statute places the burden of persuasion on
this point on the recipient, any recipient who is compelled to use a religious
child care provider may have a valid legal objection under the TANF statute
and state regulations implementing it, as well under the Free Exercise
Clause.96 Nevertheless, given this overall set of program features, the
argument that government is violating the Establishment Clause—which,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, operates at wholesale, not retail—by pushing
the children of voucher recipients into religious experience is unpersuasive.
Suppose, however, that the federal child care program excluded relative
care and home-based child care, thus limiting the class of eligible providers to
licensed institutions. Many child welfare advocates have supported the
preference for professionalized child development centers implicit in such a
limitation.97 Consistent with this preference, suppose further that the federal
program imposed standards of cognitive learning, character formation, and
socialization skills upon eligible providers.
If, in such a program, religious institutions were included among the ranks
of eligible providers, the scheme would raise more serious Establishment
Clause concerns than the existing arrangements.98 The hypothetical revisions
to the child care program have no impact on our first inquiry, the question of
whether the recipient is under some compulsion to use the provided service.
With respect to the second inquiry, however, concerning the breadth of the
provider class from which recipients may choose, the changes are dramatic.
95 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(2)(A) (1994). Each state has its own standards of appropriateness. None

mention “religious appropriateness,” although a number of state policies do refer to a child’s “special
needs,” which might include religious needs. For a full compilation of state policies on appropriateness,
see State Policy Documentation Project, The TANF Child Care Protection: Families Covered As of October
1999, available at www.spdp.org (last updated January 11, 2001) (copy on file with authors). When child
care placements are with relatives, recipients have the arguably stronger option of complaining about their
“unsuitability,” as defined by state law and regulation. Unsuitability definitions range widely among the
states, and none specifically mention religious environment as an element of suitability. See id.
96 If the TANF system were to exclude the religious content of a particular child care provider’s
program from the grounds justifying a finding of nonsuitability, still-vital decisions under the Free Exercise
Clause would provide substantial grounds for constitutional challenge. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause forbids state from excluding religious reasons for
unavailability for work from good cause determination in the administration of unemployment insurance
scheme). The Supreme Court’s decisions in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Free Exercise Clause requires exemption from
affirmative duty of parents to send children to accredited school until the children reach the age of 16)
would clearly support the extension of Sherbert to the child care context.
97 See, e.g., Ellen Kisker & Rebecca Maynard, Quality, Cost, and Parental Cost of Child Care, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CHILD CARE 130 (David Blau ed. 1991). The idea that licensed child care centers are
necessarily better for child development is questioned in Besharov & Samari, supra note 84, at 206-10.
98 The imposition of state licensing standards on religious providers also raises questions about the
government-provider relationship, which we consider immediately below.
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The exclusion of home-based and relative care does more than just limit the
quantity of the recipient’s options. The limitation of the program to
institutional settings also decreases the dynamism in the market, because the
costs of creating a new home-based care facility are likely to be far lower than
the comparable costs to institutions, which typically involve the
reconfiguration of physical space and the employment of child care workers.99
Although these considerations are not dispositive of the constitutional
issues—in any particular market, there may be a sufficiently broad array of
institutional choices, secular as well as religious—the limitation to
institutional providers increases the plausibility of a claim that government
has steered recipients to religious child care centers.
Moreover, the imposition of stringent child development standards in our
hypothetical revision further aggravates the constitutional risk. The
government is insisting upon much more than health and safety for the
affected children; its purposes now include the far more ambitious goals of
intellectual stimulation and moral formation. By including these objectives,
the question of the government’s responsibility for the religious content of
providers’ programs becomes more complicated than under the existing
scheme.
Contrast the shape of this hypothetical child care program with the two
paradigm cases identified above, “Book Stamps” and mandatory drug
treatment. “Book Stamps” involved no compulsion to participate, abundant
choices of book providers, and government indifference to book content;
mandatory drug treatment involved the opposite conditions – strong
compulsion to participate, options limited to religious providers, and
government focus on robust changes in recipients’ character. Our revised
child care program certainly contemplates deeper individual transformation
than "Book Stamps” intends, but the compulsion to participate falls between
the two poles, and the mix among providers is variable and may, in any
particular community, include either a very high or a very low percentage of
religiously oriented providers. The revised program thus presents a close
case, one in which the placement of the burden of persuasion may loom large.
For now, we assert only this: where recipients are effectively compelled to
participate in a service program, religious providers dominate a particular
market, and the government insists on significant character development as an
99 The costs of providing such services at institutions are relatively low for child care compared to
other services, but home-based care remains cheaper than institutional care, in part because most states
exempt all home-based care from licensing requirements. See Department of Health & Human Services
Office of Inspector General, States’ Child Care Certificate Systems: An Early Assessment of
Vulnerabilities and Barriers (Feb. 1998), at 14.
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intended outcome of the service, the government is presumptively responsible
for any religious experience that is generated by the program.
2. The Relationship Between Providers and the State
Constitutional debates about voucher programs have focused almost
exclusively on the relationship between recipients and the state. Such focus,
however, misses another relationship—that between providers and the state—
necessary for adequate constitutional analysis of vouchers. In voucher
programs, the constitutionally significant interactions between providers and
the state can be divided into two categories.
First, government policies will have a profound effect on both the number
and the mix of providers participating in any voucher program. The criteria
that state officials use to select eligible providers might be broad, inviting
participation by most providers of a given service, or quite narrow, excluding
all but a few. In some cases, the criteria may skew the mix toward religious
providers. Similarly, the amount paid per recipient might be sufficient to
induce a wide range of providers to participate, or it might operate to deter all
but providers willing to render services for the lowest cost.100 With respect to
some types of service, religious providers may be disproportionately
represented among low cost providers. By effectively controlling the mix of
service providers, state policies relating to eligibility criteria and voucher
amount inevitably affect the extent to which voucher recipients are steered
into religious experiences.
Second, all voucher programs involve some degree of government
monitoring of service providers. This monitoring typically includes financial
audits, but may also encompass evaluations of the content and quality of the
service provided. As those familiar with the law of the Establishment Clause
know, government monitoring of religious institutions sometimes creates
constitutionally troublesome interactions.101 Although financial audits that
examine only whether voucher funds have been used for the intended services
100 Professor Minow has suggested that school voucher amounts usually “approximate[] the tuition
level set by parochial schools…[which] reflects subsidies from other sources,” including lower overhead
costs due to longstanding ownership of school buildings or subsidies from endowment or other private
contributions. Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 262 (1999). We
discuss the implications of voucher amounts for the Cleveland school case in Part III, infra.
101 These interactions might raise non-Establishment concerns, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
627 (1971) (invalidating program of aid to private, sectarian schools because state monitoring to ensure that
the aid would not support religious teaching creates “excessive entanglement” between state agents and
church officials), as well as Free Exercise issues, see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979). We elaborate on the place of entanglement concerns in existing Separationist principles in Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 13, at 59-62.
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are ordinarily not problematic, evaluations of service content and quality
create the possibility of what the Supreme Court has identified as forbidden
entanglements.102 In non-voucher programs, the government is forbidden
from financing religious teaching or worship. Accordingly, the entanglement
problem raised by such programs is stark; if government finances the secular
portion of a program run by a faith-intensive organization, the state must
monitor the conduct of personnel and the content of materials in the program
in ways that are highly likely to produce interactions over the meaning and
role of faith in the service provided.103 The state’s agents may overzealously
bully the institution in inappropriate ways; alternatively, the agent may be
corrupted by entreaties from the institution that she overlook religious content
in the program.
In voucher cases, however, the inclusion of providers with intensely
religious services in the overall mix creates the possibility of new and subtle
entanglement problems. First, some voucher programs include the practice of
provider reports to government agents on the progress of recipients toward
program goals. In cases of wholly secular providers, such reports are routine
and unexceptional. If, for example, those charged with drug crimes are being
provided with treatment rather than being incarcerated, it makes complete
sense for drug court personnel to monitor whether defendants are cooperating
with, and making progress in, the treatment regime.104 When, however, the
provider depends heavily on faith-based methods, state monitoring of
progress takes on an entirely different character. Progress reports may recite
the extent to which participants have accepted or surrendered to religious
faith, and state intervention in the program may take the form of tinkering
with its faith-based methods or the relationship between these methods and
others. Indeed, in voucher programs, in sharp contrast to non-voucher
programs, state monitors may have incentives to persuade providers to
increase the faith content in their methods rather than tone them down or
segregate them.

102 The factors utilized by courts to evaluate entanglement concerns include “the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and religious authority.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232
(1997) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615).
103 For a helpful discussion of this problem, see Michele Estrin Gilman, “Charitable Choice” and the
Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the Need for Regulation with the First Amendment Religion
Clauses, 54 VAND. L. REV. at notes 368-384 and accompanying text (forthcoming, 2002).
104 See Hora, et al., supra note 78, at 473-80; Defining Drug Courts, supra note 82, at 10-18; see also
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government,
53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000).
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A second, and rather different form of entanglement may arise in the
voucher context. Concerned about the overall mix of religious and
nonreligious sites, rather than the degree of religiosity in any given provider,
state monitors may try to persuade some, though not necessarily all, providers
to tone down their religious content, or to make it an optional part of the
service, as a way of expanding the number of sufficiently secular alternatives.
In this setting, in which certain amounts and distributions of religious
experience among providers may properly be tolerated by the government, the
problem of agent bias looms especially large; monitors may perceive a greater
degree of sectarianism in unfamiliar faiths.
The existing child care program, and hypothetical variations on it, helps to
illustrate many of the ways in which aspects of the provider-state relationship
may implicate the government in religious experience. Under the current
program, the criteria for provider eligibility are capacious, inviting both
religious and nonreligious institutions, as well as relative care and homebased care. In general, the program tends to draw a wide variety of providers
and in no way tends to favor religious institutions over any other type of
provider.105 With respect to entanglement concerns, the current program
gives little ground for worry. Because the standards for inclusion of providers
focus primarily on health and safety of children, the government’s ongoing
monitoring includes, at most, an occasional inspection designed to ensure
compliance with these concerns.106 Such inspections present little risk that
government agents will try to reshape the religious content of these child care
programs.
As in the case of the recipient-government relationship, however, one can
imagine revisions to the government-provider relationship that raise
legitimate constitutional concerns. First, as before, if relative and home-based
care are eliminated from the mix of eligible providers, the percentage of
religious institutions among the providers necessarily increases. As the
proportion of religious institutions increases, the argument that government is
steering recipients toward religious experience becomes correspondingly
stronger. Second, without regard to the inclusion of relative and home-based
105 The original version of the Child Care and Development Block Grant scheme required states to
offer payment rates at an amount equal to or greater than that charged by local providers at the 75th
percentile, but the 1996 welfare reform eliminated this requirement, and a number of states now set rates at
a lower amount. Besharov & Samari, supra note 84, at 200. Because average rates tend to be lower for
home-based care and relative care than for day care centers, however, see id., lower payment skews the
market away from child care in religious institutions rather than towards it.
106 Unlicensed providers are not subject to standards, and critics complain that enforcement of
standards, especially those that pertain to quality of care, are not well-enforced. Besharov & Samari, supra
note 84, at 208-09.
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care, the amount paid per voucher recipient might nevertheless operate to
steer recipients toward religious institutions. If the amount paid per voucher
recipient is limited to that charged by the lowest-cost providers, and religious
institutions dominate that class of providers, recipients will be more likely to
choose such institutions. That tendency can be exacerbated by a rule that bars
any provider that accepts vouchers from charging recipients more than the
voucher amount. Under such conditions, higher cost providers would take a
loss on any service extended to voucher recipients, thus discouraging these
providers from participating in the program, and simultaneously increasing
the proportion of religious institutions in the mix of providers.
Third, one can also imagine more frequent and intrusive monitoring of
child care programs than that occasioned by health and safety inspections
under the current regime. If the hypothetical child care program specifically
intends the social, intellectual, and moral development of children, the
monitoring of compliance with these objectives, coupled with state concern
over impermissible steering, might well involve extensive interaction between
government agents and child care providers with respect to the means used to
advance these objectives. When the providers are religious institutions, such
interactions run the constitutional danger of making the government a coauthor of the religious mission.
Our analysis of the relationship between the state and providers thus
reinforces and extends our prior analysis of the relationship between the state
and recipients. Recall that the overarching question for the constitutionality
of voucher programs is whether the government may reasonably be held
accountable for whatever religious experience voucher recipients may have in
these programs. The government may steer recipients toward religion in a
variety of ways, including compelling recipients to accept particular services,
especially services already dominated by religious providers, and structuring
policies for eligibility and payment of providers that intentionally or
unintentionally privilege religious providers. Furthermore, by financing
programs intended to transform recipients’ lives in fundamental ways, and
evaluating the methods used in such programs, the government may find itself
enmeshed with providers in determining the place and effectiveness of
religious experience in personal transformation.
3. The Relationship Between Recipients and Providers
Of the three legs of the voucher triangle, the relationship between
recipients and providers has received the least explicit attention from courts
and scholars. The fact that recipients and providers are private rather than
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state actors may explain this relative inattention. Ordinarily, constitutional
limitations do not apply to private actors. In the context of privately-financed
delivery of social or other services by religious institutions to individuals, the
Religion Clauses play no part.107 Moreover, the fact of government financing
alone does not transform private actors into agents of the state.108
If, after analysis of the other two legs of the voucher triangle, one
concludes that the government is not constitutionally accountable for any
religious experience in the program, examination of this third leg cannot
change the result. For example, in the “Book Stamps” program, the absence
of evidence that government is steering book buyers into religious
experiences renders the relationship between voucher recipients and
booksellers constitutionally irrelevant. Even if some booksellers pressure
customers to buy religious books, the Establishment Clause is not offended;
indeed, the Free Exercise Clause and other parts of the First Amendment
protect the bookseller’s freedom to encourage customers to buy, and
customers’ freedom to choose, books on any subject. This conclusion is
amply supported by the Court’s decision in Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind,109 in which a unanimous Court held that
the Establishment Clause did not bar the inclusion of an education at a Bible
college in a broad program of tuition grants for disabled, post-secondary
students. Once the Court concluded that the program facilitated private
choice among a wide variety of educational options, and therefore did not
steer recipients in the direction of religious training, the fact that a particular
student elected to use the grant to train for a religious vocation was not
attributable to the state.110
107 In the absence of relevant government involvement, the Free Exercise Clause presumably forbids
government intrusion into the relationship between religious provider and recipient. The only exception to
this might arise out of coercive and criminal mistreatment of recipients.
108 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding that a private nursing home is not a state actor
when it decides to transfer patients supported by Medicaid, a government-financed program, from one level
of care to another); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding that a private school receiving
over 90% of its funding from the state is not a state actor when it fires a teacher because of her speech
activities). A thorough analysis of this question can be found in Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, for William P. Marshall,
Deputy Counsel to the President, Re: Application of the Coreligionists Exemption in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, to Religious Organizations That Would Directly Receive
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Funds Pursuant to § 704 of H.R. 4923, the
“Community Renewal and New Markets Act of 2000” (on file with authors).
109 474 U.S. 471 (1986).
110 Id. at 487. Once courts reject the Establishment Clause defense to including this type of training in
the state program, constitutional requirements of equality in the treatment of communications raise serious
questions about the exclusion of religious training. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Our interest in the recipient-provider relationship changes dramatically,
however, if analysis of the other two legs of the triangle suggests that the state
might be responsible for the recipient’s religious experience in the program.
When the state forces or steers recipients into services provided by religious
institutions, or uses these programs to facilitate personal transformation, or
closely monitors the religious content of the programs, the particulars of the
recipient-provider relationship take on constitutional significance. In such
cases, the participant’s religious experience might plausibly be imputed to the
state. The constitutional concerns reflected in this attribution could be
mitigated, however, if the state-financed service were to be decoupled from
the religious experience, allowing recipients to partake fully of the voucherfinanced service while remaining free to decide whether or not to participate
in the providers’ religious activities.
This sort of decoupling – which the Constitution requires in non-voucher
programs – is far easier to accomplish in some situations than in others.
Consider once more our hypothetical child care program—not the real one—
in which the limited mix of providers and the state’s substantive goals of child
development may lead to a conclusion that the state is constitutionally
responsible for recipients’ religious experience in the program. If providers
are able to show that the religious experience is both separate from the statefinanced service and optional for recipients, the link between religious
experience and state action is weakened. Even if the government has robust
goals of child development, most child care service, especially for very young
children, does not present the opportunity for religious instruction. Thus, in
our hypothetical child care program, a specific religious provider might offer
recipients the option of excluding their children from religious training and
activities. At the times in which the program teaches lessons about sacred
texts and worship practices, for example, it could teach alternative and secular
lessons to those whose parents have objected to religious training.111
Such an opt-out strategy for alleviating Establishment Clause concerns is
not equally possible for every provider in every voucher program. In contrast
to the child care hypothetical, in which religious teaching may plausibly be
severed from the secular remainder of the service, some voucher programs
offer services in which religious experience or transformation are inextricably
bound up with the state’s objectives. The best example of such a program can
be found in treatment for substance abuse in a market where religious
111 We assume here that the achievement of robust goals of child formation do not depend upon
religious transformation. If this assumption is erroneous, the state should be permanently foreclosed from
pursuing such goals.
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providers dominate. So long as the government expects such programs to
produce significant characterological change—and not merely physical
abstinence—the programs operated by faith-based organizations might not be
separable into religious and secular components in ways that would permit
recipients to select only the nonreligious elements. Where such opt-outs are
feasible, however, they become secular alternatives to religion-based social
services, despite the setting in an ostensibly religious institution.112
Expanding secular alternatives in this way in turn widens the choices
available to recipients, and thereby ameliorates the constitutional vice of
programmatic steering into religious experience.
4. Viewing the three voucher relationships in combination
Thus far, we have examined separately each of the three legs of the
voucher triangle. Our analysis, however, has already begun to indicate some
degree of interaction among these legs. In this section, we will develop more
fully the connections among the various aspects of the voucher problem,
highlight features of primary importance, and suggest a methodology for
approaching the question of how and where to draw the line between
constitutional and unconstitutional arrangements.
Our analysis of the legs of the triangle revealed a number of considerations
worthy of attention, including 1) legal and factual compulsion of recipients; 2)
transformative program goals; 3) the number of providers, and the mix of
secular and sectarian among them; 4) the ways in which government policies
and market characteristics affect that mix; 5) government monitoring of
providers and provider-recipient relationships; and 6) separability of service
into religious and nonreligious components. In all circumstances, the
government must employ formally religion-neutral criteria in determining
eligible providers, and must not intentionally skew the mix toward religious
providers. These are the government’s threshold obligations.
Beyond these, the full spectrum of problems with vouchers can best be
examined through a typology of interactions among all of the relevant
variables. The typology, set forth immediately below, is structured around
our judgment that, for any given combination of compulsion and
transformation, the constitutionality of a voucher program will turn on the
particulars of the mix among providers, the government’s role in shaping that
112 When opt-outs are permissive, they are properly analyzed as part of the provider-recipient
relationship alone. When, however, the state requires providers to make opt-outs available, the requirement
can also be analyzed as part of the state-provider relationship. For the important bearing of mandatory optouts on the Cleveland school voucher problem, see infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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mix, the government’s monitoring of providers, and the severability of
religious experience from the provided service.
a. Compulsion and Transformation.
Any program that combines these two characteristics113 places government
under the most strenuous obligations, driven by concerns of free exercise as
well as those of nonestablishment. Such programs require the government to
ensure that all recipients have a meaningful choice of a nonreligious provider.
Even if the criteria by which providers are selected are scrupulously religionneutral, the requirement of a meaningful choice cannot be satisfied unless
there are sufficient nonreligious providers, of quality reasonably equal to the
religious providers, so that every participant can select freely either a
nonreligious or religious program. The government should bear the burden of
persuasion on the adequacy of the mix among providers,114 and recipients
should be entitled to individualized and fair procedures for resolution of any
disputes about the constitutional sufficiency of the choices provided.
Principles of due process require individualized proceedings in such cases,
because recipients are forced to choose between religious liberty, on the one
hand, and some other aspect of liberty or property, on the other.115 Only by

113 The most obvious example of such a program is mandatory treatment, aiming at comprehensive
personal change, for the problems of substance abuse. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.
McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 955-59 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (describing role of faith in wide variety of
personal changes sought by faith-intensive program aimed at treating substance abuse).
114 The appropriate placement of the burden of persuasion is an open question within current
Establishment Clause doctrine. Although the Supreme Court has never focused on this precise issue, its
formulation of the effects test in Establishment Clause cases leaves ample room for the view that apparent
government support for a sectarian religious program triggers an obligation on the government to show that
it has not caused forbidden, religion-enhancing effects. Perhaps the clearest statement of the state's
responsibility to minimize the religion-advancing consequences of its actions appears in Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Pinette v. Capitol Square Advisory Board. 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). In that opinion, Justice O’Connor argues that the state has an “affirmative obligation” to
dissociate itself, by disclaimer or otherwise, from the religious message generated by the privately
sponsored cross, erected by the Ku Klux Klan, in the public forum on the grounds of the statehouse. Id. at
777.
115 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry, the Supreme Court held that a
faculty member holding a form of contractual tenure at a state college must be provided an administrative
hearing in which to test his allegation that he had been dismissed on the impermissible ground that he had
expressed unpopular political views. Without such an opportunity to be heard, the faculty member might
be forced to choose between his freedom of political speech and his constitutionally protected property
interest in his job.
By comparison to the problem in Perry, a person alleging that she is being forced to choose between
religious freedom to accept or reject a sectarian, faith-infused social service, on the one hand, and
incarceration or a fine, on the other, should be similarly entitled to be heard on her complaint that she is
being compelled impermissibly to surrender her religious liberty.
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meeting these stringent obligations can government fulfill its constitutional
duty not to force people into religious experience.
Legal compulsion to participate in some government “service” may be
somewhat exceptional. In a far greater range of circumstances, the
compulsion to use the service will be factual rather than legal; that is, the
service facilitates escape from desperate circumstances, even though there is
no penalty associated with refusing the service. In such cases, government
obligations remain strenuous, although significantly less so than in the case of
legal compulsion. When government uses vouchers to make available an
essential good or service, it is constitutionally irresponsible for it to remain
indifferent to the possibility that the voucher program may generate
significant factual pressure on recipients to undergo religious experience.
Such indifference is a matter of attitude, not result, and we believe the
Establishment Clause here should be construed to enjoin the government
attitudinally as well as behaviorally – that is, it must be sensitive to these sorts
of pressures, and it must make an affirmative, good faith effort to ensure that
recipients have a substantively meaningful choice between secular and
sectarian providers.
We will say more about this in connection with the Cleveland school
voucher case, but here a different example should suffice. Suppose that
government makes available through vouchers a program of treatment for
substance abuse for all low-income people, completely independent of the
criminal law. Such treatment is a matter of powerful need if the lives of those
addicted to drugs or alcohol are to be improved with respect to physical
health, economic well-being, familial relations, or otherwise. If the providers
of such treatment are overwhelmingly faith-based, the state should not remain
passive or indifferent to a provider demography that will effectively steer
potential clients to faith, and discourage the irreligious from getting help.
There are many ways in which government might act on this affirmative
obligation, including offering its own secular service and creating financial
incentives for private, secular providers to enter the market. The context of
service will inevitably generate its own opportunities and constraints, but
government should not sit back passively if voucher provision alone does not
generate sufficient alternatives.
Even if all other obligations are satisfied, the state’s monitoring of
programs with transformative purposes presents additional constitutional
dangers. First, such monitoring may take the form of government officials
evaluating and trying to shape the content of explicitly religious programs in
light of the state’s goals. So long as there is an adequate mix of providers, the
government may include intensively religious providers in voucher programs,
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but it may not rigorously oversee the religious content of such services.116
Second, as noted above, transformative programs will invite monitoring of
recipient progress. Voucher programs that have such transformative purposes
and involve faith-intensive providers can be designed to meet constitutional
limits, but the degree and kind of interaction between state agents and
provider personnel will always be constitutionally sensitive.
b. Compulsion without Transformation.
A program of this type is best exemplified by child care vouchers for
welfare recipients, who are under a statutory duty to work and thus must find
child care.117 The program demands that child care providers satisfy only
basic standards of health and safety and does not require providers to engage
in efforts at shaping the character or intellect of the children in their care. In
contrast to the most demanding obligations imposed on the state in programs
of type a., this case presents a situation in which the obligations on the state
are somewhat more relaxed. The feature of compulsion remains present, and
the state accordingly remains obliged not to force anyone to place her child in
a program that teaches religion. Here, however, the opportunity for parents to
remove their children from some portion of the provider’s program, without
diminishing the secular value of the service, distinguishes this case from type
a., in which secular and religious portions of the service are not readily
divisible.
In the type b. example given, government must ensure that all recipients
have secular options for child care, whether by way of a secular provider or—
an alternative unavailable in type a. cases—by way of the right to remove
their children from religiously intense aspects of the program of a religious
provider. This does not include the right to be free from exposure to all
religious aspects of the provider, such as religious images on the wall or
prayers before meals—the religious provider has not been transformed into a
public institution—but only the right to be free from formative religious
education.118 Thus, the required mix of providers in type b. cases is not
116 The government may, of course, monitor the output from such programs to ensure their
effectiveness, and it may also monitor nonreligious aspects of the program, such as compliance with health
and safety codes.
117 The obligation in the TANF program is qualified by requirements that the care be “appropriate,”
with recipients bearing the burden of demonstrating the inappropriateness of any particular form of child
care, and that no state currently has a policy of appropriateness that makes any reference to the religious
character of the available providers. See supra note 95.
118 Recall that the Establishment Clause question, as distinguished from the Free Exercise question
raised by child placements, is whether the state is steering recipients into religious formation. Mild and
passive exposure to religious symbols or messages probably does not rise to the level of formative
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measured by the institutional characteristics of religious providers; instead,
the mix must be measured by the details of available programs, including
relevant rights and opportunities to opt out of religious training.
In type b. cases, the monitoring dangers take on a different dimension. If
the market lacks an adequate mix of religious and nonreligious providers,
some—but not necessarily all—providers must provide opt-outs to cure the
defect. Pressure from state agents on religious institutions to provide such
opt-outs, if such institutions would rather not, and aggressive attempts by the
state to control the boundary between secular and religious portions of
programs both raise entanglement dangers. Monitoring in this situation can
be accomplished within the constraints of the Constitution, but it must be
done sensitively. Much will turn on the adequacy of instructions to
monitoring agents.119
In the child care program as presently designed and operated by the states,
the mix of available providers typically offers to parents ample choice,
including care by religious and nonreligious institutions, home-based
facilities, and relatives. Even if home-based and relative care were to be
eliminated, the combined possibilities of secular providers and opt-outs in
religious providers may produce a constitutionally adequate mix. As is the
case in type a., however, the compulsory feature of the program should lead to
an obligation on the state to demonstrate affirmatively the adequacy of the
nonreligious options, and to provide some sort of fair opportunity to be heard
for recipients who complain of compulsion to enroll their children in
religiously focused programs. Even for those recipients compelled in fact and
not in law to rely on child care vouchers—a category that will include
virtually all low-income voucher recipients who are not also cash recipients of
government welfare programs—the government remains obliged to make a
experience. This, of course, is a tough line to draw, but our judgment is that formative religious experience
would be intense and extensive, and might include repeated emphasis on sacred stories and texts, or active
instruction in modes and meanings of worship. The Free Exercise Clause, by contrast, might be violated by
a legally coercive placement that required children to participate, even passively, in prayer or be subject to
any religious experience.
119 Similar problems attend non-voucher programs, in which the Constitution requires that all service
providers rigorously separate secular from religious aspects of the service. Overzealous monitors will drive
all hints of faith from the program, thereby discouraging participation of faith-based organizations and their
well-meaning representatives. Weak or poorly trained monitors will fail to protect the constitutional
interest in keeping the state within its secular bounds. Policing the boundary always requires sensitive and
thoughtful arrangements, whether the context is government contracts with faith-based organizations to
provide social services, or instruction in the public schools in the secular significance of religious texts or
events. For discussion of the latter problem, see Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public
Schools, 18 J.L. & POL. ?? (2002). A properly designed voucher program, with ample choice between
secular and religious providers, solves this problem by eliminating the need to monitor the faith content of
the service.
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good faith effort to have policies that will encourage the participation of
secular providers. Moreover, if any monitoring for religious content occurs in
such programs, its focus will likely be on the adequacy of the pre-monitored
mix and the state’s administrative approach to enhancing that mix. Trying to
attract new, secular providers will always be a constitutionally safer choice
than attempting to alter the programs offered by religious providers.

c. Transformation without Compulsion.
Any program that involves therapy or counseling about issues basic to the
quality of human existence—for example, sexuality and reproduction,120 or
drug dependency, or management of anger—includes personal transformation
as at least one element of the government’s purpose in supporting the
program. When recipients’ enrollment in one of these transformative
programs is legally compelled, the program comes under the analysis in type
a. Even when recipients have no legal duty to undergo the counseling or
therapeutic experience, their failure to obtain the service may leave them in
financially, emotionally, or physically difficult circumstances. At least in
some circumstances, a voucher program that promises to help recipients
address these difficulties, but includes only faith-infused providers, inevitably
steers recipients toward religious experience, and falls under our analysis of
factual compulsion in type a. above.
When potentially transformative programs are helpful but nonessential, the
government’s obligations are weaker. Counseling on sexuality and
reproduction might fit this category best; information of this character always
has transforming potential, but it is likely to be more incremental in its effect
than individualized treatment for problems like substance abuse or
uncontrollable rage. Formal neutrality between religious and secular
providers is of course always required, but the government’s affirmative
responsibilities to be proactive about the mix of providers and, beyond that, to
warrant reasonably adequate secular alternatives for the transformative service

120 In Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld against facial Establishment
Clause attack a federal statute which authorized grants to, among others, religious organizations to engage
in counseling teenagers on issues of sexuality and reproduction. The Court assumed that grantees could not
use the federal support to engage in explicitly religious instruction. Id. at 604-05. The inextricable
intertwining of the subject matter of counseling with religious precepts, however, was among the
dissenters’ reasons for taking a different view of the program. Id. at 634-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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presumably are less stringent when the service does not bear heavily,
predictably, and frequently on life outcomes.121
Compulsion or no compulsion, government monitoring of programs with
transformative purposes raises serious constitutional problems. The state may
include faith-intensive providers in transformative voucher programs, but may
not evaluate or shape the religious content of such providers’ services.
Moreover, state monitoring of recipients’ religious progress should always be
off-limits. As in type a., the government’s relevant concerns are limited to
secular measures of provider effectiveness and basic conditions of the
provider’s site, such as health and safety.
d. Neither Compulsion nor Transformation.
Any voucher program that neither requires participation, nor has personal
transformation as its intended outcome, falls into this category. Such
programs would include those providing opportunities for low-income
persons to pursue athletic or vocational interests, or children to attend summer
camp, as well as our hypothetical “Book Stamps.”122 None of these programs
is ordinarily compulsory in the legal or factual sense, and transformation,
though always possible when fresh experiences are offered, is not a feature of
the programs’ design. As always, the government is required to use formally
religion-neutral criteria for selecting eligible providers and setting voucher
amounts. Beyond this requirement of formal neutrality, however, the
government’s obligations in type d. programs are quite modest. The lack of
transformative purposes in the program, coupled with the absence of
compulsion, means that the government ordinarily can have confidence that a
voucher system will not steer recipients into religious experience.
As we explained with respect to type b. cases, nontransformative services
typically can be disaggregated into religious and nonreligious components.
Under these conditions, religious providers may offer recipients the option of
excluding themselves from religious training and worship, and providers will
121 Because no deprivation of liberty or property is at stake, in contrast to the compulsory programs in
types a. and b., we do not believe that the government is obliged to provide a formal administrative hearing,
with full due process rights, for recipients who feel they have not been offered an adequate secular
provider. That said, the presence of administrative processes for those dissatisfied with the extent to which
secular services are available would help to alleviate concerns that the government is steering recipients
toward religious transformation. Moreover, the courts are open for those who wish to complain of the
steering that may result from the alleged constitutional inadequacy of the mix. In such a case, however, the
voucher recipients and not the state, bear the burden of persuasion on the question of steering.
122 The same could be said of Witters. Witters v. Wash. Dep’t. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986). The program of tuition grants usable at vocational programs applied to a very broad class of
potential service providers, and the government’s objective was limited to creating vocational opportunities
for the blind, as a way to make them more independent and self-sustaining.
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typically have market incentives to make such offers. As is the case with type
c. programs, challengers bear the burden of proving that government has
failed to meet its constitutional obligation not to steer recipients into religious
experience. And unlike voucher programs that fall in types a-c—that is,
programs involving compulsion, transformation, or both—programs that fall
within type d. should not trigger any affirmative obligations on the part of the
government to make efforts to bring secular providers into the market.
Although entanglement problems are possible in type d. programs, they are
less likely to appear in such cases than in the other three. The government’s
obligation is at its lowest, so pressure upon it to monitor content, or to push
for opt-outs, will correspondingly be lowest as well.
5. The voucher typology at work.
The scheme we have offered is designed to advance practical reasoning
about voucher programs that fall between the easy cases at either end of the
spectrum. We want to emphasize that we are not trying to advance yet
another contestant in the elusive struggle to find adequate judicial “tests” of
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. Indeed, we hope to
influence decision-makers faced with initial questions of program design, as
much as, or perhaps more than, we might persuade adjudicators to use our
suggested criteria to measure the ultimate constitutional validity of voucher
programs. For each type of program, the framework offers a standpoint from
which to view the relevant constitutional factors.
More concretely, the framework suggests highly particular steps—
religious opt-outs, voucher pricing strategies, or government participation as a
service provider, among others—that the state might take to insure that it is
not steering recipients into religious experience. One might best characterize
the approach as an attempt to identify potentially saving features of voucher
programs upon which designers of such programs may rely. We recognize
that the certainty and predictability that many communities will need in order
to experiment with voucher programs depend upon advance knowledge and
insight about such features.
We are sufficiently without scholarly humility, however, that we are
willing to suggest that the framework we have prescribed may also function
effectively in constitutional adjudication. Indeed, we are mindful that its
incorporation into such adjudication would be the most efficient device for
persuading policymakers that our analytic approach is useful to them.
Accordingly, in the next and final part of the paper, we apply in detail the
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methodology developed in this section to the particular problem presented by
Cleveland’s school voucher program, now before the Supreme Court.
III. SCHOOL VOUCHERS IN CLEVELAND
The constitutionality of vouchers for elementary and secondary education
presents a rich context in which to test our ideas. Frustrated by the poor
performance of public schools in cities across the United States, many
legislators and educational reform advocates have turned to the mantra of
parental choice in the selection of their children’s schools. This movement
has been driven in part by a faith in markets; introducing competition among
providers of educational services, advocates believe, will create market-based
incentives for existing schools to improve. Further, parents will feel
empowered in making decisions concerning placement of their children, and
children will receive better educations.123 The movement has also been
supported by those who see public schools as poorly-equipped (and largely
unmotivated) to teach basic moral values, and who see private schools,
including sectarian schools, as the only real possibility for addressing this
deficiency.124 And, of late, the most powerful argument of all in favor of
school vouchers—the argument that has liberals wringing their hands—is that
vouchers offer the best source of hope and opportunity to poor children of
color who are trapped in violent and uninspiring urban public schools.125
123 See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6.
124 See, e.g., JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CIVIL SOCIETY (1999).
125 See, e.g., JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, SCHOLARSHIPS FOR CHILDREN (1992); Neal
Devins, Social Meaning and School Vouchers, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919 (2001) (arguing that the
voucher debate is now about helping poor urban children instead of bailing out sectarian schools or
empowering middle-class suburbanites, and that this altered social meaning will lead courts to uphold
voucher arrangements); John Viteritti, Reaching for Equality: The Salience of School Choice, 14 J.L. &
POL. 469 (1998). The voucher campaign is but a part of a larger movement in favor of school choice for
low-income families. In an important recent piece, James Ryan and Michael Heise argue that suburbanites,
fearful of the effects of the campaign on suburban public schools and property values, have tended and will
continue to oppose efforts designed to expand school choice programs that would include suburban schools
as options for urban children. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice,
111 YALE L.J. 2043 (2002). James Dwyer has advanced a new and creative argument for an expansive
voucher program designed to his specifications, which would require participating schools to abandon
religious education of the sort typically found in sectarian schools. Such a program might liberate children
from what Dwyer sees as the stultifying effects of conservative and traditional religious ideologies.
DWYER, supra note 17. However sound intellectually or pedagogically, Dwyer’s view is not likely to
attract any political support in the short run. His liberal allies reject vouchers as a threat to public schools,
and supporters of voucher programs would reject both his limitations upon participating schools and his
underlying philosophy, which de-emphasizes parental choice and asserts the right of children to a
progressive education.
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No state or city has enacted anything like a full-scale voucher program,
one that includes all students and effectively permits them to rely on voucher
financing to select freely among all accredited schools, whether public or
private. In several jurisdictions, however, legislators have approved more
limited programs, designed to liberate small numbers of economically
disadvantaged students from schools that are failing. Such programs now
exist in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and the State of Florida.126 Several years ago,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the Milwaukee program against
constitutional attack.127 The Florida program is limited to students in
chronically underperforming public schools, and is currently financing the
education of very few students.128 In Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, the federal
district court in Cleveland enjoined the operation of Ohio’s voucher
program;129 the Sixth Circuit affirmed,130 and, as of this writing, the case is
under advisement in the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. The Facts in Cleveland
The especially dire condition of Cleveland’s public schools led a federal
court, with jurisdiction arising from a longstanding desegregation case, to
place Cleveland’s school system under direct state control.131 In 1995, the
126 A number of New England states pay tuition to students from rural areas who must attend high
school out of district. These programs routinely include private secular schools, but exclude private
religious schools, which the states believe they may not include because of federal or state constitutional
limits. These policies have been upheld in recent years in Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999);
Bagley v. Raymond School District, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999); and Chittenden Town School District v.
Vermont Department of Education, 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999). An outcome in favor of the state in the
Cleveland voucher case would cast doubt on the validity of this practice.
A few other states, including most notably Arizona, have enacted schemes that provide tax credits for
contributions to private organizations that in turn provide scholarships at private sectarian and nonsectarian
schools. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) (upholding tax credit scheme against state
and federal constitutional attack). For a discussion of tax credit schemes of this character, see Adele
Robinson, Risky Credit: Tuition Tax Credits and Issues of Accountability and Equity, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 253 (2000).
127 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
128 Ryan & Heise, supra note 125, at 38 (reporting that only 52 students in Florida were receiving
vouchers under the program as of 2000).
129 72 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
130 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
131 According to the Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, “the Cleveland district met none of
the 18 state standards used to evaluate minimum acceptable performance, and students in the district
performed far worse than students in other Ohio public schools. A 1996 report, for example, found that
only 9% of [Cleveland’s] high school students pass all four sections of Ohio’s ninth grade proficiency test.”
Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 4, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885. Students
continue to drop out of the Cleveland school system at high rates; many drop out without completing the
ninth grade. See Zach Schiller & David Focareta, Cleveland’s Diploma Deficit, Policy Matters Ohio, at
www.policymatterohio.org/diplomadeficit.pdf (July 2001).
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Ohio General Assembly responded to this transfer of control by enacting the
Pilot Project Scholarship Program. This program offers parents of children in
Cleveland public schools a choice between two different vouchers for
education. The first voucher option involves scholarships for tuition at
private schools in Cleveland, or at public schools in the surrounding suburban
districts, if they elect to participate. As summarized by the Sixth Circuit:
The voucher program pays scholarships according to family
income. The program requires participating private schools
to cap tuition at $2500 per student per year and pays 90% of
whatever tuition the school actually charges for low-income
families; for other families, the State pays 75% of the
school's tuition up to a maximum of $1875.132
The program provides for a lottery system to distribute the vouchers to
eligible schoolchildren, with preference given to low-income families.133
Students enter the program in grades K-3, but may remain in the program
through the 8th grade. Any private school within the boundaries of the
Cleveland public school district is eligible to participate in the voucher
programs. Such schools need to meet Ohio’s basic accreditation
requirements, agree not to “discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or
ethnic background,” and must “not advocate or foster unlawful behavior or
teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national
origin, or religion.”134
The second of the two voucher options applies to parents who choose to
keep their children in public schools. This group can obtain vouchers for
special tutoring. As with the vouchers for private school tuition, low-income
parents who seek tutoring assistance for their children receive 90% of the
132 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000). See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3313.976(A)(8), 3313.978(A) (Anderson 2001). The statute defines “low-income” as income below 200%
of the poverty line. Id. at § 3313.978(A).
133 If there is more demand for scholarships than supply, scholarships are distributed by lottery. For
grades K-3, the priority of admission is students enrolled the previous year; then, at the school’s discretion,
siblings of children already enrolled; then children from low-income families until their number reaches
20% of the total enrolled in the previous year in that grade. If there are more scholarship-holding
applicants than available seats, admission is by lot. If these three groups do not take up all seats for
scholarship students, admission is by lot from other, non-low-income applicants. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3313.977(A)(1) (Anderson 2001). For grades 4-8, previously enrolled students must be admitted first, and
then the school may admit at its discretion. Id. at § 3313.977(A)(2). See generally, School Vouchers:
Publicly Funded Programs in Cleveland and Milwaukee, United States General Accounting Office Report
01-914 (August 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01914.pdf.
134 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.976(A)(4) & (6) (Anderson 2001).
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state-established limit, currently set at $400, while other families receive 75 %
of that limit.135 The law requires that the number of tutorial assistance grants
available must be equal to the number of scholarships awarded in a given
year.136
The voucher program commenced operation in the 1996-97 school year.
In the first year, the program granted scholarships to 1,994 students, 77
percent of whom attended religious schools. By the 1999-2000 school year,
the number of scholarships climbed to 3,761, with 97 percent attending
religious schools.137 The rise in percentages of voucher students in religious
schools between 1996 and 1999 can be attributed to Ohio’s enactment of a
community schools program in 1997. Community schools—more commonly
known as “charter schools” —receive state funds, but are independent of the
local school board’s control. Several of the largest non-religious private
schools that participated in the first year of the Scholarship Program recreated
themselves as community schools, which enabled them to receive larger perstudent amounts from the state (an average of $4,518, compared to the
maximum of $2,250 for scholarship students).138 In the 1999-2000 school
year, 1962 students attended ten community schools.139
In addition to these ten community schools and the private schools
participating in the Scholarship Program, parents in Cleveland potentially
have several other alternatives to their neighborhood public schools. One
such option thus far has not materialized – the voucher program permits the
scholarships to be used at participating public schools in the surrounding
suburban school districts, but none of those districts has ever agreed to accept
voucher students.140 One asserted explanation for this is that the
135 Id. at §§ 3313.978(B) & (C)(3).
136 Id. at 3313.978(B).
137 For a breakdown of the sectarian character of the participating schools in 1999-2000, and a
breakdown of the number of Scholarship students in schools of each religious sect, see infra note 172. The
2001-2002 scholarship number is 4,195, with roughly the same proportion attending religious schools as in
1999-2000. Amy Hanauer, Cleveland School Vouchers: Where the Students Go, Policy Matters Ohio, at
http://www.policymattersohio.org/WhereStudentsGo.pdf (Jan. 2002). See also Ralph G. Neas, Five Years
and Counting: A Closer Look at the Cleveland Voucher Program, People for the American Way, at
http://www.pfaw.org/issues/education/reports/cleveland-9-21.pdf (Sept. 25, 2001).
138 Affidavit of Steven M. Puckett, Assistant Superintendent for Public Instruction, Ohio Dept. of
Education, Joint Appendix at 161a-163a, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885. The Hope
Academies, which had been created in response to the Scholarship Program, shifted to the community
schools program because the per pupil amount is so much higher. Affidavit of Jay P. Greene, id. at 209a,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001) (No. 00-1751) (“The Hope schools, which have now been
reestablished as community schools, educated nearly 15% of all scholarship students in past years.”).
139 Affidavit of Steven M. Puckett, id. at 161a-162a.
140 Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 949.
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reimbursement amount for these public schools remains significantly below
their present expenditures per student, thus effectively requiring them to
subsidize Cleveland students attending their schools.141 Magnet schools—
specialized schools within the Cleveland public school system—provide a
more realistic choice for parents; in 1999-2000, over 13,000 students were
enrolled in 23 Cleveland magnet schools.142
Immediately after the Scholarship Program was enacted, it faced legal
challenges from teachers’ organizations and religious liberty groups. In 1999,
the Ohio Supreme Court found that the program’s original enactment had
violated a procedural requirement in Ohio’s Constitution, but the program was
quickly reenacted.143 During the state court challenges, the original
Scholarship Program continued to operate. In August of 1999, the
challengers filed suit in federal district court against the reenacted program.144
In December of 1999, the District Court granted summary judgment to the
challengers of the voucher programs, but stayed a permanent injunction of the
program pending review in the Sixth Circuit. In December of 2000, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision; it too continued the stay,
pending petitions for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
September of 2001, and heard argument in the case in February of 2002.
During these court challenges, the Scholarship Program has continued its
operation, though the legal uncertainty surrounding the program may have
discouraged new private schools from entering the market.

141 Respondents’ Brief at 29-31, & n.11, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885. This
assertion, however, conflates the difference between average cost per pupil and the marginal cost of
educating one additional pupil. The latter may be considerably less than $2500 in the suburban schools.
Moreover, other, less benign, reasons might help explain suburban reluctance to participate: perhaps the
suburbs want to wall themselves off from the City’s problems, or prefer not to have poor minority children
in their schools. See generally Ryan & Heise, supra note 125. In addition, clever lawyers from teachers’
unions might have recognized that suburban nonparticipation weakens the mix of schools, and that this
nonparticipation may be a factor in the constitutional demise of voucher programs, which these unions
oppose on the ground that they will tend to undermine financial support for public schools.
142 A study of the Cleveland system by Jay Greene claims that there are more than 16,000 students
enrolled in magnet schools in 1999-2000. See Affidavit of Jay P. Greene, supra note 138, at 217a. In its
brief in the Supreme Court, the State of Ohio claims only 13,000 students are enrolled in Cleveland’s
magnet schools. Petitioner State of Ohio’s Brief at 8, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885.
143 Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
144 The district court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering the Scholarship Program halted for the
next school year. Coming so close to the start of the school year, the preliminary injunction created
significant inequities for families whose children had been attending private schools in prior years on Ohio
Scholarships; ultimately, the court modified its order, allowing voucher students enrolled in the previous
year to continue, but barring new students from entering the program. The U.S. Supreme Court
subsequently lifted the district court’s injunction entirely, allowing new students to enter the program in the
1999-2000 school year.
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B. The Conflict in the Relevant Decisional Law, and the Sixth Circuit’s
Approach
In deciding the issues presented in the Ohio voucher case, the Sixth Circuit
panel faced the quandary that lawyers and judges have been confronting for
years – the deep contradictions embedded in the law of the Establishment
Clause.145 On one hand, reflecting the institutional concerns of the
Establishment Clause, Supreme Court decisions have for many years
emphasized the difference between government aid that flows directly to
religious institutions,146 and aid that incidentally benefits such institutions but
flows through the hands of private individuals.147 This distinction, which lies
at the heart of the fight between voucher proponents and opponents, originates
in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township,148 the germinal
Establishment Clause decision in the Supreme Court. Everson involved
reimbursement to parents of children for the costs of public transportation to
and from high schools, public and Catholic, all of which were located outside
of the Township. Although recognizing that such aid reduced the overall costs
of attending sectarian schools, and declaring that such aid went to the verge of
constitutional power, the Court in Everson treated such aid as constitutionally
equivalent to the provision of police and fire protection to sectarian schools.
Denying such aid to parents of children in Catholic schools, the Court held,
would be an act of forbidden hostility to sectarian education.
The idea that reimbursement for bus tokens represented the constitutional
verge vanished in Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v.
Allen,149 decided in 1968. Allen upheld New York’s plan for defraying the
costs of sectarian education by paying for schoolbooks for children in private
schools. The New York plan involved the loan to families of schoolchildren
of books used in fact, or approved for use, in the public schools. The plan
built on Everson’s approval of the reimbursement to families for
transportation costs; the limitation on which books could be purchased by the
State, and loaned to families, was designed to avoid the problem of state
acquisition of books with a sectarian religious flavor. The program made
145 For an excellent social and political account of the confusing and contradictory impulses in this
body of law, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100
MICH. L. REV. 279 (2002).
146 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
147 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t. of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
148 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
149 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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sectarian education cheaper for families, because, in its absence, they would
have had to buy schoolbooks rather than, as was the case in the public
schools, have them provided without charge for use during the school year.
But Allen represented a large step beyond Everson, because the aid approved
in Allen operated to subsidize the educational program rather than to
guarantee the safety of students as they traveled to and from such programs.
The constitutional themes represented by Everson and Allen proliferated in
the 1980's and 1990's. Mueller v. Allen150 upheld a state income tax deduction
for families paying elementary and secondary school tuitions, despite the fact
that the benefit of the tuition deduction went overwhelmingly to families in
sectarian schools. Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind,151 noted earlier, ruled unanimously that the state could make a tuition
grant to a blind student who wanted to attend a Bible college to train for a
career as a pastor; all of the Justices in Witters appeared significantly
influenced by the wide mix of choices, almost all nonreligious in content,
available to recipients of tuition grants for higher education. And Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District152 held that the Establishment Clause did
not justify withholding a hearing interpreter, provided at public expense under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, from a hearing impaired
young man who attended a highly sectarian school.
One might think that the line of decisions running from Everson to Zobrest
would erase constitutional doubts about the validity of the Ohio voucher plan.
Like all of the schemes for aid upheld in those decisions, the Cleveland plan
funnels aid to families, as a tuition subsidy, rather than transfer resources,
uninfluenced by individual family choice, to sectarian schools themselves.
Pushing the other way, however, is a series of decisions from Separationism’s
heyday in the early 1970's. These cases, beginning with Lemon v.
Kurtzman153 in 1971, reflect judicial hostility to any program that renders
substantial aid to a set of private elementary and secondary schools that is
dominated by sectarian schools in general, and Catholic schools in particular.
Although preceded by Everson and closely preceded by Allen, these
decisions invalidated various programs, enacted by northeastern states and
designed to shore up the Catholic school system. Such rescue operations
served several purposes, chief among them the protection of the public
schools from the large numbers of children that would suddenly be forced into
150 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
151 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
152 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
153 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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the public system if the Catholic schools were to close. Most of the decisions
in this line involved non-voucher arrangements – that is, they involved direct
transfers to sectarian schools, not dependent on the numbers of families
electing to have their children attend such schools.154 As such, they stand for
the unexceptional proposition that the state may not directly support the
religious instruction the Court believed to be pervasive in the benefited
schools.155
In a pair of cases decided in June of 1973, however, the Supreme Court
extended the holdings of these “no-aid” decisions to programs involving
tuition reimbursement to parents of children in such schools. In Committee
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,156 the Court
invalidated a scheme that provided either a lump sum tuition grant or a tax
credit to low- and middle-income parents with children in private schools,157
most of which were sectarian and Catholic. The grants and credits were
keyed to family income, and were capped at 50% of the tuition actually paid
per child. There had been no factual inquiry in the lower courts into the effect
of the tuition grants on the financial position of sectarian schools; rather, the
Supreme Court assumed, without proof, that such programs inevitably
resulted in aiding such schools.158 Of course, such programs might indeed
have aided sectarian schools, either by forestalling the flight of poor parents
to free public schools, or by adding sufficiently to the resources of parents so
154 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 520 U.S. 793 (2000); Levitt v.
Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
155 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), overruled Meek and Wolman, both of which involved the
provision of pedagogical equipment or materials that were restricted in use to secular purposes.
156 413 U.S. 756 (1973). A companion case, Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), held that the Equal
Protection Clause did not compel Pennsylvania to extend similar tuition grants to parents of children in
sectarian schools once the state made them available to parents of children in private, nonsectarian schools.
157 The grants in Sloan were made without regard to parental income. 413 U.S. at 831. The grants in
Nyquist were limited to one-half of tuition, capped at 50% of tuition actually paid, and went only to lowincome families. 413 U.S. at 756. Families with slightly higher income received “tax credits,” which bore
no relation to taxable income and which declined to zero as income increased. Id. at 757.
158 The entirety of the Court’s analysis of the effects of the tuition grants is as follows:

By reimbursing parents for a portion of their tuition bill, the State seeks to relieve
their financial burden sufficiently to assure that they continue to have the option to
send their children to religion-oriented schools. And while the other purposes of the
aid – to perpetuate a pluralistic educational environment and to protect the fiscal
integrity of overburdened public schools – are certainly unexceptionable, the effect
of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired financial support for nonpublic,
sectarian institutions.
413 U.S. at 782-83 (footnote omitted). The Court in Nyquist also noted the high likelihood that political
disputes over the future of the New York program would occur along sectarian lines and suggested that this
sort of political divisiveness raised separate Establishment Clause concerns. Id. at 795-98.
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that they could bear tuition increases at sectarian schools. But the district
court had decided the case at the stage of summary judgment, and neither of
these propositions had been proven, or even subjected to any systematic
economic analysis.159
Because Nyquist invalidated a program that transferred assistance to
parents, not to religious institutions, it stands in sharp conflict with a number
of decisions rendered before and since, and there is at least reason to doubt its
continued force. Nevertheless, a majority of the Sixth Circuit panel in Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris made Nyquist the centerpiece of its analysis and ruled the
Scholarship Program unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit emphasized certain
key features of the Program: 1) unlike Allen and Zobrest, which upheld
arrangements driven by beneficiary choice, and unlike the recent decisions
upholding non-voucher arrangements,160 the Ohio Program involved the
transfer of unrestricted funds, not goods and services, through beneficiary
families to sectarian schools;161 2) unlike Witters, which concerned the
transfer of unrestricted funds to a Bible college’s religion program, and unlike
the tax deduction scheme in Mueller, the Ohio Program did not include public
schools as entities in which recipients could use scholarships;162 3) in the Ohio
Program, quite unlike the schemes upheld in Mueller and Witters, over 80%
of participating schools are sectarian, and over 90% of participating students
attend those schools;163 and 4) the Ohio Program, unlike Mueller and Witters,
effectively set tuition rates for participating schools, and did so at a level that
induced low-cost sectarian schools into the Program while effectively
excluding higher cost secular schools.164 In combination, the Sixth Circuit
ruled, these features signified that religious indoctrination in participating
sectarian schools in Cleveland was properly attributable to the State.165
It is not difficult to see why judges on the lower courts are uncertain about
how to analyze the constitutionality of plans like Ohio’s. The relevant
decisional law contains anomalies and internal contradictions sufficient to
159 The Court was in any event asking the wrong question. The correct inquiry is focused on the
state’s complicity in religious education and the significance of the tuition grants to that complicity.
160 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
161 Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 959.
162 Id. at 960.
163 Id. at 959.
164 Id.
165 The existence of community schools and magnet schools, in the Sixth Circuit’s view, was
constitutionally irrelevant. Id. at 958. Judge Ryan’s dissent emphasizes every respect in which Cleveland
parents have “choices,” 234 F.3d at 963-974, but he does not probe the constraints on choice, and his
opinion seems as fully result-oriented in affirming the meaningful quality of the choice as does the panel
majority’s opinion in denying it.
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permit every prior decision to be distinguished on its facts. Without an
overarching theory to explain why courts should adhere to the Nyquist
approach over that represented by the other decisions upholding aid to
individuals and families, it is impossible to say which line of decisions should
control. Moreover, cases like Cleveland involve the sympathetic factor of
saving children from a set of disastrously substandard public schools. Other
features of the Cleveland story—a strong tilt toward sectarian schools in the
mix of providers, the failure of suburban public schools to participate despite
a statutory invitation to do so, and the uncertain role of community and
magnet schools in the choices faced by Cleveland parents—all contribute to
the sense that there must be a more systematic way to analyze the problem
than blind adherence to Nyquist or Witters as a result of a precommitment to a
Religionist, Secularist, Separationist, or Neutralist philosophy.
C. The Cleveland voucher story seen through our framework
The Ohio Scholarship program presents subtle and complex issues at every
turn. We begin with the question of compulsory participation. The voucher
program includes grades kindergarten through eight; virtually all children in
this grade range are subject to Ohio’s compulsory attendance laws, which
compel all guardians of children under the age of 18 to ensure that their minor
wards receive some version of acceptable education.166 Students must attend
an accredited school or some approved alternative.
Viewed at the level of legal compulsion only, the mix of choices available
in Cleveland is vast, and the compulsion to attend religious school is virtually
nil. In addition to the religious schools participating in the Scholarship
Program, which paid for almost 4000 seats in private schools in the year on
which the litigation is focused, the options presented to parents include the
Cleveland public schools, in which a seat is guaranteed to every child; magnet
schools, which as of 1999-2000, include at least 13,000 seats; charter schools,
known in Ohio as “community schools,” which as of 1999-2000 include
almost 2000 seats; and home schooling, among other less conventional
options.167 It is impossible to describe this situation as one in which parents
are legally compelled to enroll their children in religious schools.
As we have analyzed compulsion above, however, it is not limited to
circumstances in which the recipient’s unwillingness to accept the service
166 OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. §§ 3321.01-.03 (Anderson 2001).
167 These might include private schools outside of the district, health institutions in which severely
disabled children might be educated, and full-time private tutors. None of these options is likely to have
much effect on Cleveland parents with a thirst for their children to learn and few resources to satisfy it.
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results in legal penalties. Physical needs or normal human aspirations can
make a service necessary, or at least highly desirable. Because legislators,
judges, and parents recognized that the Cleveland public school system failed
to deliver a minimally adequate education, parents with children in Cleveland
public schools would not reasonably “choose” the unlimited seats available in
their neighborhood public schools.168 Even if the parents were not legally
compelled to send their children to religious schools, the disastrous condition
of the Cleveland public schools made it practically necessary for parents to
look elsewhere to meet their legal obligation and parental responsibility to
educate their children. Thus, parents could reasonably say that they were
compelled by a combination of law and fact to choose among 1) private
schools participating in the Scholarship Program, 2) community schools, and
3) magnet schools operated by the Cleveland Public School System. The
combination of legal compulsion to educate their children, and practical
compulsion to avoid substandard schools, means that parents are not entirely
free to accept or decline the offered exits from the neighborhood schools.169
As suggested by one of the questions at oral argument in Zelman,170 the
price incurred by a parent for accepting an Ohio Scholarship may be forced
exposure of her child to religious indoctrination. It is true, as the State
argued, that the record disclosed no instances of Scholarship parents who
desired a secular private school option and couldn't get one. If, however, the
best voucher schools are sectarian, parents who wanted the best education for
their children may well have accepted the tradeoff between educational
quality and unwanted—or minimally tolerable—religious indoctrination.
Here, as in the case of prayer at public school commencement or sporting
events,171 the state may not impose religious experience as the price of
enjoyment of state-created opportunities.

168 But see Richard T. Welcher, Note, If A Public School is Labeled “Failing,” Could More Really Be
Less?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2001) (arguing that schools that are “failing,” but have not entirely
failed or closed, should be considered as part of the mix available for “choice” by parents).
169 This observation leads to another, rather striking one – when public schools are good, and vouchers
seem less necessary, the constitutionality of voucher programs appears to be on much safer ground. When
public schools are failing, the policy case for vouchers gets stronger, but the arguments needed to defend
vouchers against constitutional attack become weaker.
170 Transcript of oral argument at 24-25, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885.
Although the transcript does not specify, our recollection from having attended the oral argument is that
Justice Breyer asked this question.
171 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that public school may not
authorize students to pray over the PA system at high school football game); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992) (holding that public school may not include clergy-delivered prayer in middle or high school
commencement).
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Next, we turn to the issue of transformation, and more particularly, the
relationship between the government’s intended goals and any personal
transformation engendered through the voucher experience. On the one hand,
the government’s primary aim in the school voucher program is to enable
children to achieve at least minimum academic proficiency. This goal, taken
alone, does not depend on the kind of personal transformation which, if
religious, the state would be constitutionally forbidden to promote. On the
other hand, the state’s goals in the educational process extend beyond
minimum academic competence; they include the values of good citizenship,
honesty, and respect for others. Even if these goals do not reflect thick
conceptions of the human good, children are subjected to this formation for
30-35 hours a week, many weeks of the year, and many of their formative
years. This repeated exposure of highly impressionable young people to
influences upon their character is likely to shape their moral identities for
years to come. Personal growth and development may not be the state’s
primary goals, but they certainly count among the state’s desired outcomes of
elementary and secondary education.
Under these circumstances of mixed legal and factual compulsion,
transformation over time, and a very high percentage of religious schools in
the available mix for scholarship students,172 what must the state do to avoid
the conclusion that the Scholarship Program is steering students into religious
training? To answer this question, we return to the typology outlined above.
The Cleveland voucher program displays qualities of compulsion and
transformation rather removed from those found in our mandatory drug
treatment program. Indeed, we readily concede that the amalgam of legal
compulsion and personal transformation to this degree is not enough to trigger
requirements of due process with respect to the placement of each child.
Nevertheless, the combination should be sufficient to shift to the government
the burden of showing that voucher recipients have sufficient nonreligious
educational choices, reasonably equal in quality to the religious choices
available, to preclude an inference that government is responsible for steering
children into the religious training actually received by Program-financed
172 The Joint Appendix in Zelman includes information about the sectarian affiliation, if any, of the
private schools participating in the Scholarship Program in the year 1999-2000. Joint Appendix at 281a286a, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885. The total number of schools is 56, including 35
Catholic schools (educating a total number of 2962 Scholarship students), 2 “Christian” schools (260
Scholarship students), 1 Baptist school (44 Scholarship students), 6 Lutheran schools (219 Scholarship
students), 1 Adventist school (80 Scholarship students), 1 Islamic school (67 Scholarship students), and 10
nonsectarian schools (129 Scholarship students). Sectarian schools represent 46 of the 56 participating
schools and educate 97% of the Scholarship students. Catholic schools alone represent 63% of the
participating schools and educate 79% of the Scholarship students.
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students.173 At the very least, the state must demonstrate that it has made a
substantial and good faith effort to minimize its complicity in such steering.
In analyzing the state’s obligation, we want to emphasize that the state's
good faith efforts to meet that obligation may be more important than its
short-run success in generating secular choices. In a context like that of
schools, in which the pre-existing class of providers is likely to be dominated
by sectarian entities, it will be extremely difficult for the state in the short run
to guarantee secular options of sufficient quantity and quality to ensure that its
policies do not have some steering effect. If attendance at a private school
were legally compulsory, the paucity of secular options might well be fatal.
In a setting of mixed legal and factual compulsion, and gradual transformation
over time, the state's performance—at least initially—should be measured
more by its effort than by its results. An effort-based measure would provide
both opportunity and predictability for communities wishing to experiment
with voucher programs, in ways that a result-driven measure would not.
Among other things, an effort-based (rather than result-based) standard of
constitutionality would eliminate the possibility that a voucher program could
be constitutional one year and unconstitutional the next, depending upon the
changing mix of providers in the market. If the state’s efforts remain the
same year-to-year in a program of this character, the constitutional outcome
should be similarly constant.
Has the State of Ohio made a good faith effort to minimize the religious
steering associated with the Scholarship program? We note three steps that
the State failed to take, and which might have significantly affected the extent
of religious experience caused by the program's design. First, and to our
minds most tellingly, the State did not require participating schools to offer
voucher-financed children the opportunity to opt-out of religious education.174
Such an opt-out would extend to attendance at worship services, and to
classes devoted entirely to the subject of religion. Of course, voucher
students who take advantage of such an opt-out would still be exposed to
whatever religious content remained in academic classes; to permit students to
opt out of religious content at that level would effectively require entirely
173 It is important to recall that Establishment Clause violations are “collective,” not individual, and
cannot be waived. See Esbeck, supra note 48. Like subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts,
government authority over religious experience cannot be conferred by the parties. So the absence of
objection from Cleveland families whose children are participating in the Scholarship Program does not
moot the objection to the religious steering caused by the program.
174 The Milwaukee voucher plan does require participating sectarian schools to offer such an opt-out to
voucher-financed students. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1998). The Florida plan also
has an opt-out provision, but it is narrower than Milwaukee’s. See Florida Stat. § 229.0537 (4)(j) (voucher
students may not be compelled “to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or to worship”).
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separate classes for the voucher students, or the purging of religious content
in academic classes for the entire student body. An opt-out of the sort we
describe does not eliminate entirely the religious content from the curriculum
of sectarian schools, but it does substantially reduce its volume and
intensity.175 In Cleveland, however, participating schools—though they may
not discriminate on the basis of religion in accepting voucher students—are
under no such command from the State to permit opt-outs from religion class
or worship services.
It may well be, of course, that the State’s transformative goals are better
served if voucher students are immersed in faith, but the Establishment Clause
precludes the State’s intentional reliance on religious means to serve these
ends. Moreover, the transformative goals of education do not depend, even in
a weak sense, on religious immersion; they depend, instead, on longstanding
exposure to lessons in, and models of, good character. A more
constitutionally reasonable argument against an opt-out requirement is that the
State’s academic and transformative goals may be better served if voucher
students are not put in the spotlight on account of their religious differences.
If meaningful parental choice rather than State choice is the key to the
voucher problem, however, the hard question of whether to put a child in a
religious school while keeping the child out of the school’s religious program
should be left to parents, not to the state or providers. An opt-out requirement
might drive some providers away, but it would simultaneously help the State
in satisfying the affirmative obligation that we think it should have to meet.176
In a second, conceptually important way, the state failed to take yet
another step that would have evidenced its good faith and might have
appreciably altered the mix of schools. The State of Ohio did not mandate the
participation of suburban public schools,177 at least to the extent that such
175 Opt-outs will also reduce the damage that vouchers may do to religious minorities, tempted by the
educational benefits offered by voucher programs but at risk of religious discrimination and faith dilution in
schools of faiths not their own. For an argument about vouchers that derives in part from concern for these
values of religious equality, see Alan Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher Programs Through a
Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REV. 871 (1999).
176 No party in Zelman made any mention of religious opt-outs for scholarship students. The state of
course did not want to call attention to the possibility, because it would only put its program in a poorer
light. The anti-voucher forces might have raised it, but they were committed to defeating vouchers for
private schools under any and all circumstances, and therefore had no incentive to suggest a way in which
the constitutionality of school vouchers might be saved. The State of Wisconsin did file an amicus brief in
which opt-outs were mentioned, see Brief Amicus Curiae for the State of Wisconsin at 10, Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885, but there was no mention of them at oral argument.
177 The State might also have invited suburban private schools to participate, but it is not clear whether
that would have changed the mix in a nonreligious direction, especially if tuition caps were kept low.
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schools had available seats. Instead, it permitted but did not require such
participation. Of course, such a mandate would have required considerable
political will, partly because of suburban resistance to helping in the solution
to the City’s problems,178 and partly because the unions representing public
school teachers, suburban and otherwise, are politically influential and deeply
hostile to voucher programs.179 The absence of political will, however, hardly
constitutes a good defense to a claim that the State has failed to meet its
constitutional obligations to make an effort to ensure sufficient nonreligious
choices in a voucher program. The State had taken over Cleveland’s schools
because of their rotten condition; stopping short of mandating participation by
high-quality suburban school systems in the amelioration of Cleveland’s
problems is one sign of insufficient effort in the discharge of the State’s
constitutional duties, triggered by its decision to make vouchers available.
In yet a third, perhaps more tenuous way, the State has made a suboptimal
effort at expanding the mix of voucher schools. The State might have set the
tuition amount in the Scholarship Program at a level high enough to attract a
wider range of secular private schools. As we argued in Part II.B., above, the
pricing of vouchers is an aspect of the state-provider relationship that may
affect the range of recipient choice. In concluding that the Scholarship
Program was nonneutral, the Sixth Circuit relied explicitly on the fact that
tuition had been set at $2500. The result of this, the Court reasoned, is to
“discourage[] the participation by schools not funded by religious institutions
. . . [because it is only the] religious schools [that] often have lower overhead
costs, supplemental income from private donations, and consequently lower
tuition needs.”180 Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the voucher amount
operated as an impermissible gerrymander, disproportionately excluding
secular schools that were unwilling or unable to educate children for $2500
per year.181
178 This sort of resistance seems all too typical. Ryan & Heise, supra note 125.
179 See Caitlin Scott, Bill Would Nearly Double the Amount of Tuition Vouchers. Goal is to Increase

Non-religious Schools in the Program, at http://www.catalyst-cleveland.org/12-01/extra41201.htm
(reporting an initiative by Republican state legislators to increase voucher amounts and attract new schools
into the program, and noting that “the Ohio Parent Teacher Association, the Ohio Federation of Teachers,
and the Ohio School Board Association, among other major school organizations, [are] opposed to
vouchers on principle.”).
180 234 F.3d at 959 (citing Minow, supra note 100).
181 By sharp contrast, the Milwaukee program upheld in Jackson paid “the lesser of the [Milwaukee
Public School] per student state aid . . . or the private school’s ‘operating and debt service cost per pupil
that is related to educational programming’ as determined by the State.” 578 N.W.2d at 609 (citing WIS.
STAT. §§ 121.08 and 4006m). Moreover, the Florida Scholarship Program finances each voucher at a level
akin to that used in Milwaukee. For this and other information on the Florida program and other voucher
arrangements, both public and private, see http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org. When the voucher amount is
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This line of argument dovetails to some extent with our own, but we think
there is considerably more to be said. On the one hand, it may be that higher
tuition payments for Scholarship students will induce more secular schools, as
well as more religious schools, into the market, and it may be that the new
entrants will be skewed in the direction of secular schools. Without more
facts about the existing and potential market, however, one can only speculate
about these results. For any given increase in the tuition amount, existing
schools may be drawn into the Program, or new schools may come into being,
but whether these entrants will materialize depends on a complex mix of
economic and other factors that might drive schools one way or another. In
particular, the likelihood that new providers will materialize will always be
much lower with respect to schools than some other kinds of enterprises, like
child care, in which entry is much less dependent on economic and
reputational capital. In addition, the fact that the Program was limited to 3700
Scholarships offered little promise to a new school hoping to sustain itself on
Scholarship payments; with voucher amounts and the grand total of vouchers
that low, no school could effectively sustain itself on Scholarship students.
Perhaps the best defense for the amount set by Ohio is that the state
inevitably must allocate a total budget amount to these vouchers, and each
increase in the value of the Scholarship will presumably produce a decrease in
the total number of students helped. This last observation cannot justify
intentional gerrymandering of the amount so as to favor religious schools, but
it suggests caution about attributing bad faith to the state based on voucher
pricing alone. In the end, a high voucher amount might well help the state
satisfy its affirmative obligation to take steps to diversify the mix of
providers, but a low voucher amount is not by itself dispositive in the other
direction.
We do not claim that Ohio was obliged by the Constitution to take all three
steps that might have ameliorated the constitutional problem caused by its
voucher scheme. Nor is it simple to determine whether two of three—and, if
so, which two—would suffice. We can say with confidence, however, that a
required opt-out from religious education, unlike the other two steps,
represents a distinction of kind and not degree. Suburban participation may
tied to public school expenditure (with a cap only to ensure that the reimbursement does not exceed the
private school’s actual costs), the argument that the state is rigging the market by keying vouchers to
sectarian school tuition charges is much harder to sustain. A group of Republican state legislators in Ohio
is attempting to increase the voucher amount in the Ohio Scholarship Program, although they are keying the
amount to state-wide averages for per pupil expenditures in the public schools, rather than to amounts spent
per pupil in Cleveland. See Scott, supra note 179 (reporting that a “group of Republican state senators is
backing a bill that would [increase the Cleveland school voucher amount] from $2500 to $4814, the base
amount the state currently spends on each public school student in the state.”).
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have expanded the mix of schools to an uncertain extent; an increase in the
voucher amount may have had a similar effect. But opt-outs would
dramatically reduce the steering of Scholarship students to intense religious
experience, and therefore reduce proportionally the state’s—rather than
parents’—responsibility for whatever religious training (as opposed to
knowledge, sensitivity, or insight) they receive.
With these omissions in mind, might we nevertheless conclude that the
State of Ohio has satisfied its affirmative obligation to ensure meaningful
choice between sectarian and secular alternatives with the other options it has
made available to Cleveland students – tutoring grants, magnet schools, and
community schools?182 These are indeed secular alternatives to the use of a
voucher to attend a religious school, and the crucial question posed by their
availability is that of quality. Are they at least reasonably equal in quality to
the religious alternatives the Program makes available? There are certainly
grounds for doubt. The tutoring grants are limited to 90% of $400 worth of
tutoring per academic year; at a rate of $10 per hour, which seems extremely
low for trained and capable tutors, this would buy approximately one hour of
tutoring per week during the school year. It’s hard to imagine that the option
of remaining in the traditional public schools, and getting one tutoring hour
per week, is reasonably equal to full-time attendance at a private school with a
long and successful track record for educating young children.
As of the time of the lawsuit in Cleveland, some parents did have the
option of enrolling their children at magnet or community schools. For
magnet schools to contribute to the “meaningful choice” required by the
Establishment Clause to validate the Scholarship Program, the magnet schools
must offer educational opportunities roughly equal to the private schools in
which Scholarships are used. The magnet schools, however, are being
operated by the same school system that the State was obliged to take over
because of overwhelmingly poor performance. Before reaching a judgment
on the adequacy of the magnet school alternative, courts would need much
more information about the quality of teaching, curriculum, and
administration, involvement of parents, graduation rates, school-wide test
scores, and the like. The record in Zelman simply does not speak to issues of
comparative quality between magnet schools and the private schools
participating in the Scholarship Program.183
182 The Sixth Circuit considered these options irrelevant to the constitutionality of the Scholarship
Program. 234 F.3d at 958.
183 This omission from the record may be the result of the lower courts and the parties being unaware
that the state faced this burden of persuasion. Alternatively, there may be no evidence of any such equality
to be had. See Brief of Amici Curiae Ohio School Boards Association, Ohio Association of School

60

Vouchers and Religious Service Providers
Community (“charter”) schools drew a great deal of attention in the oral
argument in Zelman in the Supreme Court.184 Community schools arguably
are closer to the private schools in the voucher program for purposes of
analyzing parental empowerment and choice. Community schools are
publicly financed, but offer their own educational program and are
independent of the City's public school bureaucracy for purposes of
personnel, curriculum, and policy.185 Moreover, when a parent enrolls a child
in a community school, public financing in an amount greater than the tuition
award in the Scholarship Program follows the child into the school.186 Indeed,
one of Ohio’s responses to the challenges to the sufficiency of the mix of
participating schools has been the assertion that some secular schools
switched, for precisely this reason of per pupil financing, from being
Scholarship schools to becoming community schools.187
The arguments about market dynamism and its effect on the mix are most
powerful with respect to community schools; they are far cheaper to bring on
line than private schools tend to be, and Ohio is making efforts to subsidize
their start-up costs with loan guarantees and low-cost leases of vacant public

Business Officials, Buckeye Association of School Administrators, Ohio Coalition for Equity and
Adequacy of School Funding, Coalition of Rural and Appalachian Schools, Ohio Association of Secondary
School Administrators, 2000 U.S. Briefs 1751 *28 n.19 (“Any district may create a ‘magnet’ school simply
by adopting a building-wide theme or curriculum designed to appeal to certain students. To say that the
State of Ohio has created ‘magnet schools’ as a distinct nonsectarian ‘alternative’ is simply a false
statement. ‘Magnet schools’ are created in each instance as a local curricular decision. If petitioners want to
inflate the number of nonsectarian ‘choices’ available to Cleveland parents, they might as well include
every building in the Cleveland district. Ohio law requires public schools to have ‘open enrollment’ within
each district. O.R.C. 3313.97.”).
184 Transcript of oral argument at 34-44, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885
(questioning Robert Chanin, counsel for the Respondents). Chanin's response to questions about the role of
community schools in the case, that such schools were part of the State’s attempt “to discharge its basic
legal obligation to provide a public education for all of its students,” id. at 36, while participating private
schools should not count as part of a single basket of publicly-provided school choices—probably doomed
his chance to win the case. Although the transcript does not identify questioners, our recollection is that
most of the questions on this subject came from Justice O’Connor, and this recollection is buttressed by a
pertinent point in the transcript. See id. at 40 (“Question [to Mr. Chanin]: So far, you’re doing a very good
job of not answering Justice O’Connor’s question.”). Both sides need Justice O'Connor's vote, and she
seemed to believe that community schools, along with private schools participating in the Scholarship
Program, should indeed count as part of the choices available to Cleveland parents. The only winning
answer for Chanin would be that community schools are too few, too new, and too unproven to suffice.
That answer, however, was presumably precluded both by the position he took in his written brief, see
Respondents’ Brief in Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 2000 U.S. Briefs 1751, at 26-29, and by the staunch antivoucher political position of his clients, the public school teachers' unions.
185 Puckett Affidavit, supra note 138, at 157a..
186 Id. at 163a.
187 Greene Affidavit, id. at 217a-218a; Brief of Amici Curiae United States, supra note 130, at 23
(citing Joint Appendix at 145a-146a, 217a-218a, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885.
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school buildings.188 Nevertheless, substantial per pupil funding obviously did
not make the traditional Cleveland public schools a good alternative; their per
pupil expenditure is the highest of all the schools available for parental
choice, and their quality seems to be the lowest. With respect to outputs,
more relevant to parental choice, community schools present a problem of
information availability akin to that presented by magnet schools; they
constitute an intriguing new aspect of the overall mix of schools, but the
number of them remains small, their enrollments are low, and most of them in
Cleveland (and elsewhere) are extremely new and so cannot be easily
measured on grounds of educational outputs. Indeed, there were only three
community schools in Cleveland in 1998-99, and seven additional schools
acquired that status in 1999-2000, the relevant year for the Zelman
litigation.189 Moreover, the fact that they receive on average more money per
enrolled pupil may explain why some schools switched from private status to
community status, but cannot by itself ensure their adequacy as an alternative.
In any event, the federal courts in the Cleveland voucher case made no
effort to measure the quality of magnet or community schools as alternatives
to private, religious schools participating in the Scholarship Program. If we
are right that the State must bear the burden of demonstrating that it has made
a good faith effort to avoid steering students toward religious training, or that
in any event the provider mix between the secular and sectarian is
constitutionally sufficient, what should the Supreme Court do? As we have
been suggesting, the minimally sufficient efforts, and conditions of choice,
necessary to avoid State responsibility for religious experience require
difficult line drawing. Nevertheless, our overarching framework leads us to
conclude that the Supreme Court should affirm the Sixth Circuit. Taken all
together, the inattention to requiring religious opt-outs for voucher students
by participating religious schools, the absence of mandatory suburban
participation, the low voucher amounts, and the lack of information about the
quality rather than quantity of other available options suggest that Ohio has
been doing what the Establishment Clause forbids – relying heavily upon
sectarian schools precisely because of their religious character, and the sort of
discipline associated with that character. If that is correct, it is surely
188

For details on Ohio’s support for community schools (“charter schools”), see
http://www.edreform.com/charter_schools/laws/Ohio.htm.
189 Puckett Affidavit, supra note 137. The timing of these schools' openings in Cleveland suggests
that it is primarily a matter of fortuity that they appear to be playing a central role in the Supreme Court's
deliberations. If the Cleveland voucher case had never been commenced in state court, and if the litigation
had begun immediately in federal court, and proceeded to the Supreme Court in an earlier year, the
community schools would not be playing the significant role that they are in the question of “parental
choice.”
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reasonable to attribute to the State the religious experience that voucher
students receive in these schools, whether or not the State has intentionally
sought that experience for Scholarship students.
If, however, the Supreme Court believes that community and magnet
schools may be shown to be sufficient in both quality and quantity to absolve
the state of constitutional responsibility for religious training received by
Scholarship students, the Court might vacate the judgment and remand the
case to the lower courts for findings on these questions. The Scholarship
Program has laudable and important goals, and it is, after all, harsh to rule
against Ohio on the basis of a placement of a proof burden not clearly
identified prior to the litigation. Although a remand on this basis would
prolong the already extended struggle in Cleveland, such a disposition would
send a constitutionally appropriate signal to lower courts and, more
importantly, to the designers of public-private partnerships in the provision of
public services, about how to think about the constitutionality of voucher
programs. At a moment in our history in which the future of partnerships
between government and faith-based organizations is at a fateful crossroads,
strong but sensitive judicial guidance on this question would be most salutary.
CONCLUSION
The Cleveland case aside, our analysis in this paper leads us to a few stark
conclusions. Voucher financing may indeed be a way to involve faithintensive institutions in the provision of state-supported service. Most
assuredly, voucher financing offers the possibility of such inclusion, without
modification of the faith program, far beyond what programs supported by
non-voucher financing may allow. This insight may be of particular
importance to the architects of charitable choice arrangements over the
coming decade.
However buoyed the proponents of vouchers—for education, substance
abuse treatment, or otherwise—may be as a result of this possibility, they
must recognize the constitutional responsibility the State undertakes when it
pursues the voucher route. The State may not steer recipients to religious
experience, and some voucher contexts will produce much more aggressive
steering than others. Recognizing the differences among programs, and trying
to design programs in ways that meet the responsibilities commensurate with
these differences, are the first steps toward constitutional success in this
regard. When those who design government services select from the thick
catalogue of options to which we referred in the opening sentence of this
piece, they must understand that inducing the needy and vulnerable to come
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to religious faith is not an appropriate instrument of state policy. Programs
designed to do just that push the State into territory forbidden by the
Constitution, which, properly understood, protects the enterprise of religious
devotion by leaving it in the hands of the people and beyond the grasp of state
power.
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